The transitory nature of social movement mobilisation and its consistent defining of political protest outside the structures of the state, has led to the emergence of two predominant schools of thought. One, ‘Resource Mobilisation’ theory, has concentrated on the ability of movements to mobilise via bargaining processes produced by state centres called political opportunity structures (Jenkins & McAdam 1995; McAdam 1996).1 The other, ‘New Social Movement’ theory, provides an alternate path of viewing the trend of re-emerging social movement activism throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as a rational political choice amongst political activists seeking solutions outside formal state structures (Kriesi 1995, 1996; Touraine 1995). In my opinion the fixed structure of both theories, the former’s over concentration on the role of the state’s bargaining process vis-à-vis political opportunity structures offered the periphery (Gellner 1977; Schwartz & Shuva 1992), and the latter’s negation of the state (Giddens 1981, 1994; McCarthy & Wolfson 1992), have limited not just the nature in which one can view movement mobilisation to action, but also the very reciprocal nature of state centre and periphery development.

In this chapter I intend to explore not just the inapplicability of both ‘Resource Mobilisation’ and ‘New Social Movement’ theory, but also the dynamic relationship between the centre and periphery in creating and expanding movement, and protest repertoire. The greatest problem I find with ‘Resource Movement’ theory is that as a paradigm it is more suitable to the North American environment from which it emerged. An environment that is geared to exploring the nature of extra-parliamentary protest activism in a democratic system, designed to incorporate and absorb differing political identities and issues through the bargaining processes of state (Mayer 1995; Przeworski & Laitin 1995). ‘Resource Mobilisation' theory has tended to concentrate on how movement activism has been able to attain full political enfranchisement of minority viewpoints through creating access points within departments of policy formation, even if only at an advisory level (McCarthy et al. 1996). It also presupposes the fact that every value held by mobilised groups is negotiable, and hence flexible. This at once negates the ideational nature of protest activism (Heberle 1995).

The problem with this American statist institutional paradigm is that it has little relevance in the re-emergence of social movement activism in Europe throughout the 1960s, where pre-existing elites viewed social movements as a direct threat to their ethnic and class interests, as in Northern Ireland, Spain and Yugoslavia. Similarly 'New Social Movement' theory, whilst concentrating on the counter cultural nature of student, environmental, and sexual political activism, negated the state as anything but an object of derision for these mobilisations (Tarrow 1996).

In my opinion, the state remained the catalyst to extra-parliamentary mobilisation. Be it as the object of discontent, the target of protest, or the very institution within which these peripheralised movements sought redress. The problem with 'New Social Movement' theory was that it viewed contemporary post-World War Two protest activism in terms of life style choice (Habermas 1981). The ‘life style choice’ paradigm wrongly presumed that the combination of social democracy and free market capitalism automatically provided answers that forced people to seek solutions within alternative counter-cultural movements (Touraine 1995). Where this theory fails is in falsely presuming that ethnic, sectarian, class and gender issues have in some way been resolved. In reality, although Europe may be heading towards political integration (Balme 1995), the cleavages steeped in ethnic, sectarian and class prejudice still undermine many a political system governed by entrenched elites (Wallerstein 1985; Keating 1995). What is needed is a more flexible theory that may absorb the notion of political opportunity structures, that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory offers, and the routes to counter cultural movement proffered by 'New Social Movement' theory.

What I propose to demonstrate in this chapter is that no one theory is sufficient in explaining the rise of ideational movements in post-World War Two Europe without exploring the integral role of the state in mobilising peripheries, often inadvertently, to political action. I believe that the dynamic relationship that exists between the centre and the periphery is at the core not only of the movement, but, of state development as well. It is a cycle of perpetual shaping and reshaping that creates a level of interdependence between the two antagonists. My opinion is, that the state not only provides the reasoning behind initial mobilisation but also the target by which a movement may seek political inclusion or rebellion. As such, movement activism is a vehicle, for political mobilisation against the centre, and the creation of an autonomous political space, is a consequence of the failure of the state to facilitate the advancement of a given political community due to the exclusive nature of its competing ideational formation.

'Resource Mobilisation' Theory: The Failure to Grasp the Nature of the Dynamic Relation between the State and the Periphery.

The resurgence of social movement activity in the 1960s and 1970s was to play a significant role in the reinterpretation of socio-political relations in the post-World War Two era (Hobsbawm 1974b; Laqueur 1993). It was an epoch that had previously offered respite from the radical and revolutionary roads to political modernity that seemed to be the accepted path in the evolution of participatory democracy (Przeworski 1985). Within ‘Social Movement’ theory itself, the sudden rise of protest activity in both the First and Second World was to question more traditional means of interpreting protest action and social movement development; such as theories based on behaviouralism, mass society, relative deprivation and political sociology (Tarrow 1992; Lyman 1995a). Though integral to the formation of ‘Social Movement’ theory, some of these schools of thought concentrated too much on individualistic, and mass psychological value related systems, for the reasons behind extra-parliamentary collective mass political participation (Fromm 1991). These seemed to place the fault within the behavioural structures of individual activists (Popper), as opposed to the failure of the system to fully enfranchise certain sectors of society. The reason being that it was taken for granted that democracy, as it stood, was the apex of political development, and as such, the failure of democracy to be fully representative was never seriously taken into account (Wallerstein 1985; Fukuyama 1994).

The social psychological aspect of social movement research also tended to be inherently elitist and anti-democratic through its tendency to marginalise all social movement activity as an expression of discontent amongst those unable to compete within structures provided by the democratic state (Gamson 1992: 53). From this perspective, the rise of movement activism in the face of ever increasing wealth, education standards, housing, and disintegration of traditional class barriers, was to overturn any notions that it was a residue of deprivation induced by industrialisation (Burke 1992). The events of the 1960s brought a realisation that the road to political modernity, as well as political participation, could not be placed neatly into the established institutionalised paradigm of democratically inspired bargaining processes between competing interests, without fully taking into account the effectiveness of non-institutionalised means of effecting social policy and political elites (Laqueur 1992: 345).

It was in the face of such social upheaval that a new solution was sought that would explain the reoccurrence of movement activism (McClurg 1992: 5). This alternative was found with the development of the 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s through the extensive research of social movement theorists such as Jenkins (1977), McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977). The gap that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory was able to fill was the realisation that protest activity was far from spontaneous and disorganised in nature (Klandermans 1992; Morris 1992). Thus, suggesting that those who participated in them were far from being the irrational actors that the regimes they opposed tended to portray (Ferree 1992: 29).

At the core of such activity was a structured extra-parliamentary response by communities to the inability of the government to actively deal with demands they thought were irrelevant to the set political agenda (Tilly 1978; della Porta & Tarrow 1986). 'Resource Mobilisation' theory hence sought to provide an organisational base for the study of movement development, with the aim of demonstrating the significance of organisation, mobilisation, and elite manipulation of popular culture in formulating constructive political demands from sections of the community that were previously unable to gain access to the processes of policy formation (McCarthy et al. 1991; McCarthy et al. 1992). 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists such as Zald (1992: 331) felt that the main fault with previous social movement theories, those that were based on social psychological and ideational paradigms, were that they tended to search for historical occurrences rather than “changes in theoretical assumptions.” As Margit Mayer (1995: 173) argues: 'Resource Mobilisation'’ theory assumes that mobilising grievances are ubiquitous and constant. Furthermore, RM authors thought that the role of ideology could be downplayed since the belief systems of most movements of the 60s and 70s were recognised as extensions of the basic liberal concepts that dominate American public discourse.

The tendency within this new paradigm to equate activism within the parameters of its role in the established political system, I feel, ignored those who defined themselves as political challengers to that system. To view them as simply new claimants would ignore groups such as national movements who sought more than the solidification of their interests within an oppositional paradigm (Tilly 1984b, 1993b; Gellner 1994b). Essentially, it ignored those groups seeking a complete redefinition of the nature of power relations within a given state (Lo 1992: 224).

This anti-ideational stance was, according to Oberschall (1973), derivative of the political environment that surrounded activism in the USA. The realities of the American political culture showed that grievances did not necessarily transform into political activism, nor was there a guarantee that the mobilised would come from the aggrieved group (Zald & Ash 1966; Snow et al. 1986). In a system, seemingly lacking the tradition of an oppositional culture, what seemed most likely to determine the success of one elite’s mobilisation campaign was their ability to control the relative resources made available by the state (Zald 1992: 332-333). Without established means of political formation, and a tradition of official participation, the likelihood of successful mobilisation would be minimal.

What occurred was a convergence of political terms, such as ‘rights’, due to their strategic importance for minorities in guaranteeing full political enfranchisement, and ‘real politik’, in as much as accepting that no change could occur, and no further ‘opportunity’ could be granted without prior acknowledgement of the primary legitimacy of the system that had up till then oppressed these very minorities (Gamson et al. 1982; McAdam 1982). As Tarrow (1995: 189-190) stated, when talking of the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s: In the black middle class that was the movement’s main constituency, the concept of “rights” and the attendant one of “opportunity” were deeply embedded, allowing the movement to mediate between its major internal constituency and the white liberal “conscience constituents” who bolstered it from the outside. It is in this very conciliatory aspect of 'Resource Mobilisation' theory, in its overemphasis on consensus (Gamson 1992a), that I believe we may find the limitations of the American school. These limitations were embodied in the failure to fully comprehend protest activism that sought to entrench itself as the oppositional, alternative force to that of the government. It is little wonder that Tarrow (1995: 196) saw the Europeans as leading the way in developing a new theory as they could build on more solid traditions of oppositional culture. The differences between the American and European experiences are fundamental. They inherently lie in the more eclectic nature of American social movement development that has led many 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists to include social protest, cults, crowds and collective behaviour under the heading of social movement activism (Mayer 1995: 170).

America was fundamentally, a more decentralised political system that had by the 1970s successfully halted violent polarisation between movement and government (McCarthy & Wolfson 1992). This enabled the ideology of movements to formalise their demands, through government extension of political opportunity structures, to become the dominant social ideology (Herman & Chomsky 1988). I believe, this ability of successive American governments to co-opt social movements, through emphasising the importance of maintaining populist models of independent organisation as guarantors of liberalism and individualism, explains why support bases for potentially radical alternatives such as the Black Panthers, or the United States Communist Party, are so readily formalised into the American electoral system (Jenkins & Eckert 1986).

For European movements, however, who seemingly lacked the “founding myths and liberal theories of dissent” (Mayer 1995: 185), they had to come to terms with dismantling the old order (Hobsbawm 1996: 287-319). The lack of structural means to fully absorb discontented minorities, due to the innate centralist orientation of most established European nation-states (Gunther 1992; Higley & Gunther 1992), was to lead to a polarisation of elites and a crisis of state legitimacy (Tilly 1975c, 1993b). This presented unique opportunities for the development of mass inspired extra-parliamentary modes of political participation and activism designed to exploit such ideological cleavages.

'Resource Mobilisation' theory came from the understanding of the significance of the role of social networks (Melucci 1992a), indigenous organisational strengths (McAdam 1996), political opportunity structures and resource pools (Gamson & Meyer 1996), when the mobilisation of communities were at a minimum. In this way it was to play a major part in determining the importance of non-governmental institutions in the formation of public activism. Yet, it still could not explain why movements remained dormant for so long, only to explode at a given time. The 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm seems to ignore the very historical nature of peripheral activism (Tilly 1978), which is essential to the establishment of traditional institutions of social activism that were the foundation of past civil rights and national movements such as the Black Churches of the American South (McAdam 1982: 87), the Gaelic Athletic Association of Catholic Ireland (Sugden 1995: 204-207) or the cuadrillas of the Basque Country (Clark 1986: 304-305). This is a problem that Snow and Benford (1992: 135) believe is due to the lack of ideational factors in the construction of 'Resource Mobilisation' theory.

I believe much of this has occurred due to the tendency of 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists, such as Zald and McCarthy (1977), to emphasise the similarity between conventional and protest behaviour. This notion of what is normative and non-normative political behaviour, in itself, tends to become somewhat ambiguous once one undertakes an extensive study into the history of social movement activism throughout Europe over the past two hundred years (Tilly 1978, 1986). Even the processes of determining what has become viewed as normative or non-normative political action is derivative of the historic development of power relations between elites and minorities, or between centre and periphery, within the subject states under the peruse of the researcher (Inglehart 1977). Mayer (1995: 182) even proposes that theories on movements themselves are predetermined by historic machinations of the times, as they often arise at important conjunctions of history.

This problem, of the negation of the historic role of the state in reciprocal centre-periphery development, faces many ‘Social Movement’ theorists when trying to apply 'Resource Mobilisation' theory to the problems of Northern Ireland or the Basque Country. Zald (1992: 327), in fact, believed this could be attributed to the predominance of the 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm within the field of Social Movement theory throughout the 1970s. What constrains 'Resource Mobilisation' theory is its inability to find a meeting point between culture and structure, as it tends to reject totally the ideational role in political mobilisation and collective action (Morris 1992: 351; see also Melucci 1992a, 1992b). From this perspective, I feel, not only does 'Resource Mobilisation' theory fail to fully explain the rise of peripheral movements in contemporary Europe, clearly defined on ideational notions of class and sex, but it fails to provide an explanation for the emergence of new challengers of the political order that are clearly nationalist, sectarian or regional in ideology (Klandermans et al. 1988; Melucci 1996).

For a contemporary Europe that, at the governmental and economic elite levels, is clearly moving towards economic, social, and political union, movements based on nationalist and sectarian ideologies in Northern Ireland (Farrel 1976; Hedges 1988), the Basque Country (Burton et al. 1992; Llera 1993), and Croatia (Dodan 1991; Tanner 1997), have proven to be the greater threat to established nation-states than those who desire simple enfranchisement (Nairn 1977: 219). This minimisation of the ideational aspects of movement mobilisation places too much emphasis upon the nature of the relationship between social mobilisation and political opportunity structures made available by the enfranchising state. Thus, in turn, diminishing the role that grievance, collective beliefs, and collective identity in the mobilisation of people to political rebellion (Klandermans 1992: 78; see also Gamson 1992) .

The aim of this thesis, nevertheless, is not to diminish the role of political opportunity structures provided by the state in the escalation of protest activity. I believe, in fact, state instigated opening of political opportunity structures is a necessary precondition of peripheral mobilisation. Nevertheless the fact that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory tends to place it at the centre of the escalation of protest activism, over emphasises the significance of political opportunity structures as objects of mobilisations (Burstein et al. 1995: 281). This tendency emerges from the desire of most 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists to separate reason from emotion in the course of organised political opposition in the name of state consensus (McCarthy & Wolfson 1992). Billig (1995), following on from Gamson’s (1995: 65) acknowledgement of the social psychological aspects of collective action, notes that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory tends to overlook the meaning of collective action as a source of identity proclamation for the participants. What has developed has been a school of thought that concentrates too much on the machinations behind structures of organised political protest activism (Zald 1970; Morris 1992), without fully acknowledging the role of grievance, ideology, and collective goals, in the formation of such political activism (Giddens 1979; Melucci 1996).

'Resource Mobilisation' theory, in concentrating on the popular base and the political action tends to shy away from the link between the two which Gamson (1992: 57) feels lies in the traditional desires, actions and organisation of a given community that come together to form the “consciousness of identity.” It is within this ‘consciousness of identity’, that a definition of the ‘other’, the competing elite and the state, come together to form a place within the collective psyche of a given community. An identity that places them at the centre of “an uphill symbolic struggle since every regime has some legitimating frame that provides the citizenry with a reason to be quiescent except in the pursuit of their civic duty” (ibid.: 65). For European Social Movement theorists unhappy with the discourse presented by 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists, and realising the historic nature of such transformation, 'New Social Movement' theory seemed to provide some ready made answers for the European experience (Melucci 1985, 1992a, 1996; Klandermans & Tarrow 1988; della Porta 1996).

'New Social Movement' Theory: The European Answer to the Rise of Ideational, Rather than Consensual, Social Movement Activism.

The intransigent nature of centre-periphery and elite-mass relations was to play a major role in the development of 'New Social Movement' theory throughout Europe (Tarrow 1977). In the 1960s a new generational elite emerged who not only had little memory of the horrors of the World Wars, Hitler and Stalin, but, had little time for a political system created on notions of exclusivity through the entrenchment of specific class and generational interests at the centre of the state apparatus (Hobsbawm 1996: 320-343; see also Giddens 1974). Rapid industrialisation in southern Europe had not necessarily been complimented by equivalent political restructuring (Hobsbawm 1996: 304; see Wallerstein 1985). Countries such as Spain and Yugoslavia, saw a continuation of the old ethnic order even in the face of massive demographic, social, political and cultural change, instigated through mass internal migration and greater class mobility (Laqueur 1993: 346). The pace of political inclusion continued slowly throughout the rest of Europe (Tilly 1975c). Except in, I believe, newly defeated Germany and Italy, where political restructuring was forced as a consequence of military defeat (della Porta & Rucht 1995). Difficulties of restructuring, or influencing, established modes of governmental redress, forced a reappraisal of the legitimacy and validity of liberal democracy as the established means of resolving competing demands (Wilkinson 1971: 90). A new form of political organisation was needed in first communicating public discontent with the established bargaining processes of state, and secondly, in expressing individual and collective demands in organised anti-institutional ways. Party political organisations were not only dependent entirely on the continuance of the established electoral system, but their innately hierarchical structure meant that upcoming elites found it very difficult to get their demands heard (Gildea 1997: 35; see Melucci 1989). In such political circumstances, new forms of political expression were sought that aimed not only at forming a focal point for future mobilisation of political discontent, but also creating the political space considered necessary to facilitate political mobilisation outside government run political structures (Giddens 1994; della Porta 1995; della Porta & Rucht 1995). For those students of the 1960s searching for political consensus, as well as ultimately the inclusion of their political demands, it was the social movement that seemed to best facilitate the development of independent ideational political mobilisation (Kriesi 1996: 154).

The experiences of the Long May in Italy,2 from 1968 to 1973, as well as the extension of the non violent direct action (NVDA) into political terrorism in West Germany from 1968 to 1971, suggested that traditional means of redressing social discontent, found in the electoral system, no longer suited those who felt marginalised and isolated from political opportunity structures offered by the state (della Porta & Rucht 1995). Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that the natural consequence of mass social discontent was the development of violent anti-establishmentarian political action. Jürgen Habermas (1981: 33), following on from Ronald Inglehart (1977), noted that what arose instead was a “silent revolution” in societal values and attitudes. One that would manifest itself through a new politics that was not dependent upon state engendered issues of economic, social, domestic and military security, but “quality of life” issues (Habermas 1981: 34).

These issues were to deal specifically with what Habermas (ibid: 33) called the ‘threat to the life-world’. That is the organic environment of communally formed beliefs and issues that by-passed the official channels of communication offered via governmental institutionalisation, policy formation, and participation in the electoral system (Habermas 1994). This was an extension of Habermas’ (1973: 41-82) notion of the public sphere splitting politics from ethics so as to provide for discursive spaces to arise that would enable the individual and collective to create “counter-public spheres.” In my opinion such an alternative form of mobilisation is bound to fail as the societal values they reject are extensions of social structures of state; leaving the state as a central target of mobilised discontent.

Nevertheless, what developed here, amongst 'New Social Movement' theorists, was what Melucci (1989: 56-57) called “submerged-networks”; forming within the underlying social cleavages of post-industrial society in direct opposition to the political opportunity structures offered by the state as depicted by Touraine (1971: 38) and Giddens (1977: 157-158) critique on Habermas’ (1982, 1983) theory of social reflection and self-realisation. These submerged networks evolved due to the inability of the state to provide sufficient political structures for the incorporation of these newly marginalised post-industrial classes (Melucci 1989, 1992a; Giddens 1994). Ideologically, and sometimes ethnically, indefinable, these new social interest groups- often formed around issues of sexuality, disarmament, environmental and anti-nuclear concerns- were searching for their own organisational constructs independent of the state (Kriesi 1989; Klandermans 1990; Kriesi et al. 1995). The key was the ability of the individual to attribute specific meaning to social action, which places the significance of the action on a more personal level than any government instigated action could (Melucci 1996: 218).

'New Social Movement' theory was to be democracy in motion. Central to this was the organic nature of these new forms of social organisation in their ability to influence political party decision making processes, even when bypassing more established means of lobbying, bargaining and participation (Klandermans 1990; Touraine 1995; Kriesi 1996). For Melucci (1989: 41) the importance of such a new development in ‘Social Movement’ theory was that this new era promised a recognition that social conflict possessed more permanent structures, which inherently co-existed with established non-party political organisational forms of movement, such as classes, interest groups and associations. What emerged were new cultural codes of communication and organisation that are embodied in more flexible forms of collective action (Crelinsten 1987; Friedman 1992; Melucci 1992a; Morris 1992). Barbara Epstein (1991: 23), in the case of the civil rights movement of the American South, and Hanspeter Kriesi (1996: 160-165), in the environmental movement in Germany and Switzerland, show that it was the initial success of protest activism in restructuring aspects of governmental policy that convinced the public that a place could be found for the 'New Social Movement' as
a political guarantor against further government encroachment.

Herein lies the importance of 'New Social Movements’, ie, in their ability to provide an alternative to more staid means of social and political organisation. Touraine (1995: 391) felt that the old style of movement, exemplified in the 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm, was too concerned with the influence of established elites and ascension to power, rather than the formation of other variant consociational models of dispute resolution. Under such guises they did not only offer a new perspective in Habermas’ (1981: 35) ‘life-world’, but provided an alternative space for social mobilisation, organisation, and stabilisation outside political options offered by the state, due partly to their porous and absorbent nature. Central to this development were increased tensions between those who supported more traditional forms of human political relations (McCarthy & Wolfson 1992; Zald 1992), and those who sought a redefinition of power systems (Touraine 1971). This had as much to do with an overall societal shift in values, as it did with the emergence of a new affluent generation that began to point out the contradictions between ideology and reality (Laqueur 1993).

According to Epstein (1991: 36), at the centre of this new mobilisation of discontent would be the formation of counter culture. A development of social and political expression that would drastically redefine power relations between generational elites. This fits into Melucci’s (1985: 792) belief that movements are societal constructs designed to facilitate the development of new political ideals, that are unacceptable to the established order, by creating a space outside the accepted means of conflict resolution. This rise of counter culturo-political organisations, however, was to bring around a crisis of identity which would question the value of tradition per se (Tilly & Tilly 1981; Melucci 1995; Zald 1996). Especially, when tradition was becoming viewed as a reactionary ideology designed to maintain the established social order by taking on the passive role of “bastion against social change” (Giddens 1994: 5). Accordingly, the dynamics of social discontent demanded that a more active agent be found to represent “non traditional” interests in contemporaneous political environs (Klandermans 1990).

When placing a movement’s empirical unity at the centre of ‘Social Movement’ theory, rather than concentrating on the starting point of political action as the cause of collective activism, 'New Social Movement' theorists sought to redress this new cleavage between traditional and non traditional modes of political activism (Touraine 1988, 1995). This was done through reintroducing the very ideational and social psychological reasons behind collective action that 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists had negated (Burke 1992; Morris 1992; Gellner 1994a). Melucci (1995: 44) feels that identity is important to this process, especially in post-industrial times, as the movement cannot exist without preformulated goals which are central to the survival of their mobilised constituency.

It is a relationship built within societal cleavages that allows for the ability of the individual, or the collective, to define one’s space in which political action may occur according to the dictates of society rather than the dictates of the state (Gamson 1992b; Melucci 1995). More significantly, it is a recognition that movement activism tends to “reveal the irrationality upon which existing forms of inclusion/exclusion are based” within the state system (Tazreiter & Morris 1996: 6). In this sense, the ability to define the movement, that is the action and culture of the movement, outside the structures of state, enables marginalised groups seeking redress to create their own political structures. As Melucci (1985: 789) argues: Though empirical features can vary widely, they become stable and irreversible components of contemporary social systems, because they are strictly connected to deep structural changes in these systems.

For 'New Social Movements’ this supposed permanent stratification has led to a parallel societal formation in direct opposition to state sponsored forms of socialisation (Oberschall 1973; Tilly & Tilly 1981; Abercrombie 1992). Called “submerged networks” by Melucci (1992b), these submerged channels of communication provide an alternate cultural perspective that is embodied in the formation of submerged identities through societal trends, sects and other counter cultural groups. The problem I find with Melucci’s (1995: 49) argument is the presumption that a movement finds its identity, rather than the movement being a by-product of the assertion of an established identity. I believe both, in fact, may occur as shown with the reinvention of Irish identity in Northern Ireland for the former, and the Croat national movement’s continuation of the one politic as an example of the latter.

'New Social Movement' theory fails due to its inability to find a role for the state in this restructuration of identity through collective action. Giddens' (1981) structurationist theory of the state best points out the effects of such action on human beings and the reaction of the state in turn. In my opinion, following on from Giddens (1979: 96), the very rejection of the state and its role in political mobilisation by ‘New Social Movement’ theorists ignores the central role of the state in the formation of alternative structural and societal identities. Thus, redefining the role of the state as catalyst of initial mobilisation becomes integral to any study seeking to understand why peripheral communities seek to offer political alternatives in the first place. The state’s role remains significant to movement mobilisation, because without it providing the target for discontent there would be little reason for the movement to mobilise in the first place. This indirectly implicates the state, even as a static target of dismay, as a reason behind alternative mobilisation.

If we take nationalist movements as an example, then there is little doubt that submerged networks can formulate new cultural codes of communication in the form of stratified anti-statist oppositional identities.3 Without the initial understanding of the significance of belonging to the original mobilisation, then one would question why did they seek to initially join a national movement if it did not represent who they were as a political collective?

I do agree with Melucci’s (1989: 45) argument that the reliance on 'Resource Mobilisation' and traditional social psychological theories in studying questions of identity and codes of expressing discontent are too quantitative, and overtly mechanistic, a method of reviewing the reasons behind collective action. This is because in attempting to move away from overtly state centred and historical perspectives they have not fully investigated the nature of communal grievances- be they social, economic, cultural or political- in the mobilisation of historic communal identities to political activism. The significance of this creation of new identities and modes of cultural expression for political activism as a societal gel is at the centre of what Geertz (1973: 316-323) sees as the attempts of 'New Social Movements’ and 'New Social Movement' theorists to redirect power away from the political centre to the cultural periphery. As Swidler (1995: 27) states: If culture influences action, then, it is not by providing the ends people seek, but by giving them the vocabulary of meanings, the expressive symbols, and the emotional repertoire with which they can seek anything at all.

Gamson (1992: 140) saw this as the creating of one’s own agenda outside the state’s influence; whilst Touraine (171: 103-106) felt this was a sign directed at the elite, that if they continued to ignore popular will, then the people would be forced to create their own political structures that would dictate new societal norms, which would in turn exclude the elite. What I believe such movements attempted to achieve was to provide linkages for collective utilisation of individual resources and self sustainability so as to avoid the communicative blocks that occur through bureaucratic and governmental channels. At the core of this is the recognition of the centreless nature of the political system (Melucci 1996: 18; see also Foucault 1980, 1984).

In such circumstances, what defines the system are relations set in place by independent and relatively autonomous structures within political society (Giddens 1979: 120). This, in turn, suggests that change cannot effect power relations within the state, as these relations are essentially multi-relational and lacking consolidated power (Giddens 1994: 93-94). In this case one must ask then, how can 'New Social Movement' theory address the question of the rise of national movements throughout Europe? The answer, Melucci (1996: 226) believes, is that the 'New Social Movement' is able to shed the concept of the simulacra, that of the information disseminated in protest activism ‘mimicking’ a reality of its own discontent- of itself, to create of an autonomous political space. Yet the state still is integral in providing a target and it is here I feel that 'New Social Movement' theory falls down.

The Role of the State.

What I believe has occurred is a polarisation between established state means of culturo-political expression, and the counter mobilisation of the periphery, which places the state at the centre of peripheral development as the raison d’être of a movement’s initial mobilisation. This, further entrenches the centre’s predominance. However, the significance of submerged networks in acting out cultural symbols, in order to signify manifest discontent to the elite, points out the futility of creating a theory that can so readily negate the role of the state as a major reason for peripheral mobilisation in the first place (Melucci 1985: 789). Such a view can be perceived as inflexible.

Della Porta (1992) and della Porta and Rucht (1995) highlighted that a crossover between movement and party political activism is quite common, suggesting that any attempt to further negate the role of the state, in either assisting in the formation of movement activism or providing a target for collective action, is misplaced. Social movements, therefore, must by viewed in terms of “action systems”, working within the confines of opportunities and limitations granted within a given political environment (Melucci 1985: 792). These action systems can move fluidly in and out of the established parliamentary system pending on the willingness of the government to accede to certain demands at varying times. In this way it is dangerous to ignore the role of the state in shaping a movement, either as a target for an expansion of protest repertoire or as an entity to ‘mimic’ once the goal is achieved.

The key here is the expansion of repertoire through reactionary responses to the ever more sophisticated methods of the centre’s co-opting of oppositional forces into the established political order (see: Zald & Useem 1987; McCarthy et al. 1991; della Porta 1995; Jenkins 1995; Weitzer 1995). Charles Tilly in his book The Contentious French (1986) highlights that the history of social movement activism suggests a predisposition of peripheral goals towards full political enfranchisement, or the usurpation of state. This is especially the case when dealing with ideational inspired movements like labour, student and regional movements (Louise Tilly 1981, 1995). This fact was highlighted by the May 1968 riots throughout Europe, which were not as concerned with formulating an alternative social system, as they were of rallying against the cumbersome pace of educational reforms under the de Gaulle Presidency (Gildea 1997). A situation further emphasised in the rapid decline of protest activism with the implementation of the Faure reforms (Tarrow 1993c: 600).

Tarrow (ibid.: 582) notes that what has become predominant within the European political spectrum was the development of four elements of state engendered political opportunity structure that are at the heart of collective action throughout Europe: “electoral realignments, the opening of institutional access, the presence of influential allies, and divisions within the political elite.” A fifth element would develop which could be misinterpreted by 'New Social Movement' theorists, that Tarrow (ibid.) defines as “the availability and extensions of new frames of meaning.” I believe the significance of the state, either as a target of or as raison d’être for mobilisation, seems to be further demonstrated in studies based on similar movements that emerged in response to the May demonstrations in 1968, be it Germany (della Porta & Rucht 1995), Italy (Lange et al. 1990), Northern Ireland (Maguire 1996a), Spain (Hipsher 1996) or Yugoslavia (Ercegovac 1992).

What I think Tilly (1985), Tarrow (1996) and della Porta (1996) demonstrate in the European case scenarios, is that 'New Social Movements’ somewhat idealistically ignore that many of these movements seek to resolve these crises of participation, inclusion, and representation, not by fully rejecting the state altogether, but by seeking to reconstitute the state in a form that can accept their future participation. This is especially the case with the Basque national movement that has sought to ‘mimic’ the state in miniature, through creating an autonomous regional state within the greater Spanish nation-state (Conversi 1997).

What the student protests in Paris, Bonn, Prague, Milan and Amsterdam demonstrated was that not one of these movements have survived, having dissipated once the state had met their aims (Oberschall 1978; Blanke & Sterzel 1983; Duchen 1986; Joppke 1991). One of the main reasons for this is the mono-generational nature of these movements and their lack of political continuancy, once the initial demands have been met (Oberschall 1978). Melucci (1996) himself has come to recognise this in later studies, and in doing so has accepted the importance in mending the distances between more structural statist approaches ('Resource Mobilisation' theory) and the ideational ('New Social Movement' theory). Klandermans (1992) and Gamson (1975) have also begun to realise the transient nature of these movements and the need for the expansion of repertoire in order to create a secure political environment wherein gains won cannot be wantonly rescinded by the centre without an established course of redress being made fully available to the general public.

The Dynamic Nature of State Reform and the Consolidation and Expansion of Social Movement Repertoire as a Means to Social Movement Continuance.

Where both 'Resource Mobilisation' and 'New Social Movement' theory fall down is in their lack of ability to combine the necessity of political opportunity structures in mobilising movement activism and ideational raison d’être for the continued existence of the movement, in direct opposition to that offered by the state. What they tend to ignore is what I believe to be the most important aspect of movement mobilisation- that of the dynamic relation between state and periphery in the mobilisation of communities to rebellion. Here the state is more than a target of movements. It is the means by which a movement defines its identity and strategy. This is achieved via ‘mimicking’ the process of reform, or shifting centres, in order to place their demands on the political agenda in ways that would otherwise be denied.

Hence, for peripheral movements to continue with demands for collective autonomy on specific issues, there must be a form of organisation made available to them which can act as a guarantor. Something steeped in communal continuance as, lets say, the imagined nation holds in the people’s mind (Anderson 1993, 1996). It is in their transient nature that 'New Social Movements’ fail to resolve the issues behind some of the most prevalent and long lasting social movements in contemporary Europe. Those movements that are clearly defined along statist, nationalist and sectarian lines, as is the case with the Croatian, Basque and Irish nationalist social movements.

I believe that this dynamic relationship can be best shown in an empirical study of the Irish, Basque and Croat national movements and their varying pushes for autonomy through ‘mimicking’ the very state centre they oppose. The state, therefore, is the reason behind peripheral mobilisation, but it is the periphery’s ability to manipulate the processes of state engendered reform through challenging the state’s instigation of a cyclical strategy of action-reaction-action that determines their success. Integral to this is how the movement chooses to expand its repertoire, in order to engage the state, without fully ignoring the political opportunity structures that emerge in the escalation of the crisis itself.

In this sense Northern Ireland and the Basque Country have also provided an anathema for social movement theorists, whereby in spite of continued government attempts to co-opt them politically through the increased reliance of social welfare policy in alleviating socio-economic grievances, people have clearly equated individual liberty with the collective experience of their national community (Gallagher 1991, 1995; Dunn 1993, 1995; Knox & Hughes 1995). Even though 'New Social Movements’ have recognised the significance of codification of discontent (Melucci 1992a, 1996), they have failed to fully acknowledge in what context mobilised discontent arose, and to what extent institutionalisation of identity played in the formation of organised collective action (Swidler 1995: 32). Della Porta and Rucht (1995: 233) have also recognised that 'New Social Movement' and 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists have ignored the spatial and temporal diameters which are found within national boundaries that heavily influence the nature of the demands put to the centre.

This is perhaps why Gamson (1995: 61), who has traditionally been associated with 'New Social Movement' theory, has called for a re-evaluation of Social Movement theory along two lines: firstly, by recognising the significance of the pre-existing social relations in the historical specific construct of the rise of mobilised political discontent, and secondly, a reappraisal of the role of organisational support systems in forming the needs that embody the movement’s collective identity. Essentially, what is needed is a coming together of the structural forms of state inspired collective action inherent in 'Resource Mobilisation' theory, and the ideational factors that have emerged from 'New Social Movement' theory. A re-evaluation that becomes important in a political environment whereby the re-emergence of old lines of societal cleavage with the growing strength of traditionalist movements throughout post-Cold War Europe, be they nationalist or regional oriented, is a common occurrence.