As discussed in the previous chapters, 'Resource Mobilisation' and 'New Social Movement' theory have failed to provide the necessary explanation behind the rise of contemporary ideational movements. The failure, as I have previously mentioned, lies I believe, in the negating of the state as the catalyst for oppositional mobilisation. The dynamic relation between state centre and periphery development has provided the political environment that is based on exclusion, and inclusion, which in turn, shapes the nature of movement activism, and the levels of anti-state activity from the margins of the state’s polity. Thus what develops is what I call a ‘mimicking’ of the state which places the state’s response to peripheral demands through policing, or acceding to demands, at the centre of the activism. Hence, if the nature of a state elite’s dominance is ethnic based, as in Spain and Yugoslavia, it will be countered from the periphery as such. Similarly, as in the case of Northern Ireland, if the ascendant elite is defined in terms of sectarian nationalism it will be countered likewise.

What develops is a cyclical reciprocity, a ‘mimicking’ of the other, that perpetuates the interdependent development of centre and periphery. That, due to the nature of the nation-state, can only be defined in terms of state centralist consolidation and expansion upon the periphery (Strayer 1963; Deutsch 1969b; Tarrow 1977). It is the perpetual shaping and reshaping of competing ideational movements that underpin the interdependent state and periphery development which predetermines the nature of movement development, as oppositional movements attempt to ride the cyclical nature of state engendered reform, through the implementation of a strategy of action-reaction-action, to shift their demands to the centre of the state’s political agenda.

This eventually leads, through ‘mimicking’ the state’s response, to entrenched social discontent and illegitimacy of the state centre’s rule over the periphery (Gamson 1968). It is from this cycle of action-reform-action that movements emerge ever more sophisticated and entrenched within the communities they purport to represent (Tarrow 1996, Maguire 1996b). In the case of communities mobilising behind nationalist and regional ideologies, the cycle can grant their demands a sense of continuity that social movements under other circumstances cannot claim (Tarrow 1993b; della Porta 1996). Thus, in this chapter, I wish to demonstrate how the state, by providing the opposing ideology, whilst formalising and consolidating power, provides the necessary catalyst for the rise of peripheral movement activism.

The main premise will be that it is the shifting, reforming state centres, and their subsequent inability to deal with emerging demands on the periphery, that provides the catalyst for peripheral mobilisation. By reviewing the work of Tarrow (1977, 1991, 1995), Tilly (1978, 1984, 1997), della Porta (1983, 1995, 1996), Melucci (1985, 1989, 1996) and Maguire (1996a, 1996b) I wish to demonstrate how the escalation of conflict through expanding protest repertoire from NVDA to violent direct action (VDA), and eventually into party political formalisation, provides the necessary precondition for creating permanent peripheral movements as a counter force within, not without, the established state system.

Political opportunity structures become integral, but they do not, as in 'Resource Mobilisation' theory (Zald & Useem 1978; McCarthy & Wolfson 1991), become the sole path to political inclusion. The reason being that, in the case of many ideational movements, even the appeasement of initial demands of enfranchisement satisfy few movements when the expansion of repertoire brings a subsequent widening of a movement’s own perception of its role in the running of the state itself (Tarrow 1993c; della Porta & Rucht 1995). An expansion of repertoire that entrenches itself on the periphery until, only through gaining control of the very cycles instigated by the centre’s reforms, specifically in terms of controlling the pace of reform, can they create their own political centres interdependent of the state’s. In doing this, movements are able to control the speed of the state’s response, when they cannot control the direction of the reform itself. Thus, the cycle of protest, and the ability of the movement to respond to the state’s own attempts to redefine and shape its future role in the development of political society, is at the core of the rise of peripheral activism in post-World War Two Europe.

The Cycles of Protest.

The importance of developing a dynamic theory based on the relationship between the state and periphery in the reemergence of movement activism since the 1960s, lie in the ability of the cyclical paradigm to offer opinions on four problems that have not been fully explored in more recent theories. The four problems that contemporary theories have not fully addressed are:

1. why a group of people who share an interest might act together;
2. too many studies concentrate on one movement which fails to deal with the complex nature of movement activism that could be better explained in a cross movement analysis;
3. the usage of static models for dynamic entities totally misses the mark; and
4. there is too much emphasis placed upon causation and not enough on the purposeful dynamic nature of social movements (Tilly 1985: 717-718).

This means rejecting many seminal works from 'New Social Movement' theorists such as Touraine (1971) and Zolberg (1972) due to their overt concentration in ignoring the influence of overtly centralist regimes in peripheral movement mobilisation, as well as many theories of alienation like Fromm (1942) and Feuer (1969), since not all action is undertaken from a position of total exclusion. It is here that I feel that the temporality of the study of protest cycles proved significant. Giddens (1979: 120), of all the theorists, saw that time allows social change to be defined in terms of the dynamic nature of the state. Without which the framing of a cycle, especially the cultural and historical reasons behind the mobilisation of specific grievances, would be impossible. A situation that Snow and Benford (1992: 141) felt extended the cycle to incorporate temporal variations that increased the scope of incorporating national, regional and communal examples into a more general theory. In this sense movements are but a response, a signal that Melucci (1996: 1) calls the heralding of the arrival of “disenchanted prophets” that name the disruption as a form of communication, whilst the state dictates the direction in which it proceeds through its own actions.

It is Tarrow’s (1993c: 582) five characteristics of cycles of protest which I think best describes the overtly dynamic nature of movement activism. In addition, the influential role the state plays as determiner of the relationship between the centralised elite and the movement is also significant. Protest waves are but responses to the politicisation of society at the hands of a consolidating state that are implemented in order to take advantage of the cleavages that develop between the state and mobilised social discontent through the peripheral movement. It is in this context that the importance of the cyclical paradigm should be understood.

Heightened Levels of Social Conflict and the Cleavage between the State Centre and Movement Periphery as a Cause of Peripheral Mobilisation.

In studying the nature of protest cycles, especially the initial stages of the mobilisation of discontent, one may find that cleavages emerge from a conflict of interests, as well as a conflict over the consolidation of political power (Tilly 1978: 7). On their own this may not necessarily lead to conflict between centralised state elites and marginalised peripheries. This is especially the case, when the centralised state elite may have so minimised the opportunity for action that it becomes almost impossible for movements to develop without great risk to their own constituency (Mitchell 1991); despite ample political opportunity structures offered by the state in incorporating dissident aspects of society in toto (Graham 1986). In combination, however, with historic precedence and sub-merged grievances, cleavages may prove large enough to define the nature of regime and periphery relations (Tarrow 1995: 155).

The greatest criticisms, made of Tarrow (1991, 1994) and Tilly (1984) have come from theorists, such as Piven and Cloward (1992), who take into account the roles 'New Social Movements have played in the development of Social Movement Theory. Piven and Cloward’s (1992: 304) argument centred around the belief that both Tarrow and Tilly’s views concentrate too much on the idea of reactionism toward the authorities, hence, granting too much credence to the state in the creation of the environment. The fact that much activity has taken place as a direct result of state engendered social cleavage seems to weaken this argument. Melucci (1996: 5) believes that it is in the processes of state consolidation of power that the state formalises these cleavages into institutionalised conflict in order to solidify their advantage over the periphery.

Yet, for any cognizance to emerge, one must readily be able to view the difference that has arisen in the consolidation of power relations between elites and non-elites (Anderson & Dynes 1975: 17). There must be an awareness of inequality- be it political, social or economic- for cleavages to be individually realised, and for conflict to emerge in a collective sense (Tilly 1985: 730). Essentially, at the core of conflict development is the ideological polarisation between sections of communities which, through the development of oppositional ideational or communal belief systems, become considered even more important to the continued existence of the relevant community (Lo 1992). For this reason alone we have seen the emergence of ideational movements in direct opposition to those proffered by reforming state centres (Horowitz 1985, Safran 1987, Conversi 1997). It is where these cleavages between state centre and peripheral oppositional ideology remain, and where the issues remain imperative to the participants, that we find the mobilisation of discontent into collective action (Tilly 1978).

What develops in the literature is a recognition of the parallel development of contention along side conflict, whereby contentious issues manifest, through general mobilisation of the periphery against the centre, into an expansion of a movement’s repertoire that embraces conflict as a means of engaging the state directly (see Tilly 1993a). Polarisation however does not occur here, rather an initial radicalisation emerges through collective frustration of the marginalised group’s inability to get their issues addressed. At the commencement of movement activity conflicting interests may emerge, but they tend to be manifested either intellectually, or through actualisation of socio-political stratification (Melucci 1992a). Polarisation occurs once the initial stage of protest has already been undertaken, and the challenge to the state, or its policies, is clarified (Tarrow 1991). Yet, none of this could happen without the shaping that occurs from the external environment that surrounds the movement. This emerges, according to Tarrow (1995: 10-11), because fundamentally all collective action is rooted in social structure, especially within social cleavages that emerge through political stratification. Tilly (1994: 6) feels it takes any form of radical change, be it revolutionary or socio-economic, to provide the necessary shift within an environment in order to shape the nature of state reform and periphery reaction.

It is in fact the stringent ideological divide, in which conflict festers, that enables a culture of political debate to arise which has heightened levels of political participation amongst younger, marginalised generations (Tarrow 1980: 168). When the state continues to block such incorporative tendency it is then, and only then, that groups threaten to go extra parliamentary, as grievance mixes with frustration and solidifies behind the need of the marginalised to reassert themselves upon the political scene (Gurr 1970; McAdam 1982, 1996). This, I feel, interestingly suggests that it is the dynamic relation between centre and periphery which in itself perpetually redefines the state. Thus, institutionalised conflict not only may be a cause of mobilisation, but also that of the struggle between state and movement.

Political grievance, therefore, does become important, contrary to 'Resource Mobilisation' theory, in mobilising a population to political action (Tarrow. 1989. p3). Yet, to say felt grievance alone is sufficient in mobilising a populace would be wrong. Even if a particular group felt aggrieved, due to the structural position in which they found themselves within society, this grievence may not be enough to initiate political mobilisation because without state pressure it is doubtful the reason for oppositional mobilisation would exist (Wallerstein 1979: 1985). It is political specific factors, such as the nature of state accommodation, or repression, that determines whether the situation will spiral into a cycle of protest or remain submerged (Meyer 1993; della Porta 1995). For these to develop they must run sufficiently deep enough so as to ensure that the conflict is considered a defining point of communal identity (Tarrow. 1989. p9). Thus, the cycle only develops when structural cleavages designed to cope with popular discontent and grievances prove too deep, and too visible, too overcome ensuring that the established nature of elite isolation from the periphery is perceivable (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; della Porta & Rucht 1995; Ercegovac 1996).

For many marginalised communities conflict within itself may provide a perspective of historicity, as in the nature of sectarian relations in Northern Ireland to Irish Republicans and the way the marginalised Catholic views the Protestant as central to the denial of their civil rights (Carty 1996: 113-116). Without the existence of the recalcitrant readily identifiable privileged group, like the Protestants in Ulster, a movement of resistance would find it hard to justify its continuous state of heightened mobilisation (Lee 1995: 432). Historic state engendered polarisation creates an enduring conflict that allows competing national identities to develop simultaneously according to the needs of each group. As Tilly (1993a: 268) states:

The action takes its meaning and effectiveness from shared understandings, memories, and agreements, however grudging, among the parties. In that sense, then, a repertoire of actions resembles not individual consciousness but a language; although individuals and groups know and deploy the actions in a repertoire, the actions connect sets of individuals and groups.

Tarrow (1985: 216) feels this may be due to the fact that it is in these transitional zones of societal development, where traditional and modern interests clash, that the state allows for these conflicts to become entrenched. The reason being that in the process of change one inflates the value of traditional interests amongst the yet to be incorporated intermediate strata which allows for subsequent social tensions to ultimately shape the nature of centre-peripheral relations in developing systems.

What allowed previously dormant discontent to mobilise is the nature of the regime’s response to initial non confrontational levels of discontent (Maguire 1996b). If the state is aggressive then the periphery will follow suit, which in turn acts as a catalyst to further state intervention and expansion upon the periphery that continues the cycle of responsive action that underlies the struggle between centre and periphery. In this sense the state goes a long way in providing the reason, as well as political opportunity structure, for these movements to emerge onto the streets and eventually widen their influence throughout the rest of society.

The Predicator Centre: The Diffusion of Law as a Catalyst to the Commencement of the Cycle of Protest from Centre to Periphery.

Collective action itself is heavily dependent upon opportunity in determining the estimated costs and benefits of likely activity (Mayer 1993; Burstein et al. 1995; Klandermans 1995). These costs and benefits are related to the cycle of “repression/ facilitation, power, and opportunity/ threat” (Tilly 1978: 99); which in turn, are all related to the extent in which collective action effects power relations within a given political environment (Gamson 1995). Yet, the relation between the two faces of repression/facilitation and collective action is not there. This is because the notion of power for the movement is non existent prior to the moment of action (Havel 1985). It is only at that moment of realisation of action, that repression translates into power through its physical manifestation (Jenkins & Klandermans 1995). Once the cost of collective action increases, then there is a corresponding rise in power relation tensions between governmental and non-governmental organisational structures (Tilly 1978: 100-101).

The question that then becomes for me imperative, is what causes this cycle to commence? As viewed in chapter 2, the fact that cleavages emerge in any process of power consolidation may not necessarily be a reason for a rise in conflictual circumstances, even if we accept that conflict is a precondition to mobilisation. What must be found is a facilitator of grievance manifestation, which I believe lies in the state. It is through the state that diffusion of laws, control, and societal norms occur that dictate acceptable means of societal and political organisation, for all communities found within the state’s bounds (Weitzer 1990). It is, hence, the action of the state in diffusing power over its subjects, ie, in the nature of the repression utilised in the name of power consolidation, that determines the nature of the marginalised group’s reaction (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Roberts 1986). A reaction that commences a cycle of conflict, that offers its own forms of political opportunity structure (Ercegovac 1996). At the peak of each cycle each movement would have developed an expansive repertoire that clearly was responsive to political opportunity structures offered by states in transition, causing a spiralling outwards of demands from concentrated conflict, into direct challenges upon the state (Koopmans 1993; McAdam 1995).

What history has taught us from Martin Luther’s time to the present, is that people succeeded in their movement activism when they were led by actors “who possessed organisational or institutional resources”, (Tarrow. 1993b. p76) and when this coincided with periods of state/dynastic succession that created a shift in popular legitimacy that could create space for a broader confrontation. They were reactive to the state elite’s response to crisis in government. What highlighted this amongst fledgling nationalist movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and I suggest modern nationalist movements as well, was their adoption of actions that were designed to manipulate institutions rather than outright oppose the centre of power (Connor 1994f, 1994g). The politics of desired inclusivity emerged and they were based on more modular forms of direct action (Tarrow 1993b: 77). Their narrowness in scope, but flexibility in utilisation, allowed strikes, for example, to unite whole groups across the nation that open revolt could never have achieved before (Chevalier 1973; Morgan 1987; Touraine et al. 1987; Louise Tilly 1995).

The social movement itself became of struggle, allowing it to be a permanent threat in its ability to mobilise and act over a period of time, as well as allowing for the institutionalisation of conflict per se. One action could produce another, developing a ripple effect that could perpetuate, sustain, and maintain a cyclical action over time that creates counter networks to those offered by the elite (Lo 1992; Melucci 1992a). This in itself would create more crises, hence pushing states towards policy shifts earlier than intended. Through ‘mimicking’, one class could encourage others, creating not just more leverage to challenge rules, but extend the attack on the state. Thus, the way the state would react to these attacks would determine the durability of the movement. Greater state penetration created greater resistance, yet a spreading of the state’s concentration could also allow for more spaces to open so as to challenge the state (Tarrow 1993b: 83). The state, hence, provided more than a fulcrum for discontent, it set the pace of oppositional mobilisation through its integrative anti-periphery actions.

The State as Reactionary Catalyst.

The May 1968 Student Movement demonstrations in Paris perhaps best show how governmental centres may attempt to utilise movement activity as a vent for popular frustration (Gildea 1997: 166; also Sorter & Tilly 1974; Bridgford 1989). Like O’Neill in Northern Ireland (Kelly 1972: vi-vii), de Gaulle seemed content on riding the threat posed by the student movements in order to convince those not previously willing to listen, that if some form of reform was not implemented then the possibility of further disturbances would arise (Tarrow 1993c: 582). Governmental influence in creating the cycle of action-reaction-action seems to be an extension of state control in so much as that, by allowing such protests to occur the other, ie, the periphery, can be more readily recognised and a clearer understanding of their grievances be attained. No government can claim legitimacy through a continued reliance upon repressive modes of policy implementation without having space for tolerance and facilitation in their state (Weitzer 1995). Yet, the opening up of previously submerged cleavages by the centre may indeed allow for counter-movements to create space for themselves in the gaps left between the challenging group and the state (Tarrow 1995: 24).

This point was highlighted in Northern Ireland with the re-emergence of the Protestant Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) as a political force when the state was not seen to be reacting firmly enough against the fledgling Catholic led Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) (Boulton 1973: 116). In such circumstances the state can revert to their overtly centralist policies in order to maintain state security (Kelly 1972: 7-10). Each government responds variedly to different groups and actions taken against them, yet all are mindful that they themselves are sending out a message with each action undertaken against the periphery (Finer 1975; O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Klandermans et al. 1988). According to Tilly (1978: 106), there does seem to be two ways in which they may act in raising the cost of collective action:

(a) by simply diminishing the difficulty of specific varieties of mobilisation and/ or collective action, and (b) by providing positive incentives for specific varieties of mobilisation and/ or collective action. In its extreme form facilitation may also lead to punishment of those who refuse to comply to government incentives.

Both, however, are linked through their emergence in the process of the diffusion of law, order and state dictated societal norms. Yet without flexible, reactionary strategies, it is difficult for any movement to exploit grievances that emerge from consolidated centralist rule. Hence, the diversification of social movements, and their receptiveness to change, may determine the ability of the movement to survive the collective monolith that is the state. No one movement can suffice in taking on institutions that are diversified in their formation of policing, legal, parliamentary, social welfare and media strategies, unless they seek to ‘mimic’ the diverse strategies of centralisation through an expansion of their own strategies of action (Tarrow 1983; Snow & Benford 1988). Tilly (1978: 156) recognised that in taking on the state, not only would a movement have to concentrate upon placing their own demands at the centre of the state’s agenda, but, they would also find themselves influenced by societal norms that had been moulded by the state through policing, law and education. As Jenkins and Klandermans (1995: 3) notes:

The state is therefore simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organiser of the political system and the arbiter of victory.

Notions of right and justice, the routinisation of daily life, the internal organisation of a national polity, the accumulated experience of repression in the face of past protest action, and the patterns of past repression within the state, I believe, have all greatly influenced the inability of a solitary movement to engage the state successfully. The Spanish social movement opposition to the Falangist state monolith, which in itself was ideologically defined in terms of a popular movement (Fraser 1986), would not have succeeded if it had not splintered into a multifaceted movement alliance that was able to take on the state monolith at different levels of engagement. Yet, it was still the state as target and creator of cycles of reform that provided the structures for the democratic opposition to formulate their strategy.

Similarly, it was the way that the Falangist state would respond to a diversification of movement repertoire and strategy, that could commence the reciprocal development of competing ideologies, ie, the next stage of the cycle (Apter 1979; Bell 1979; Boggs & Flotke 1980). Repression begat reaction, which in turn, begat repression, creating a cyclical responsive relationship between centre and periphery that would shape both the centre and periphery’s political actions, and hence identity (Conversi 1997: 231). A mutual codification of communication which entrenched conflict within the parameters of continual state development, and allowed for competing national movement ideologies to develop in direct opposition to one another.

Social Movements as the Source of the Legitimate Alternative Response to the Centre’s Encroachment.

The multiplous nature of movement activity lies in the source of its activism within the social sphere. Various studies have come to highlight that within most movements, the initiative for applied collective action arises within the subdued networks that it itself produces; thus, its activists tend to emerge from the restructuration of protest (see Melucci 1989; Maguire 1995, 1996a). This suggests that the socialisation and ritualisation of protest activism can act as an organisational or structural incubator for many a social movement (Kertzer 1988; Epstein 1991; Melucci 1992a). What the movement provides, and here I agree with Tarrow (1995: 22), are sets of social networks and institutions that can provide a link between participation and the development of traditional social orders of familial, religious and folk groupings found within the peripheral ethno-national community that many centralist states cannot provide. Trust and co-operation are central here to mobilisation, and it is within more traditional institutions of society that these movements tend to gain a sense of legitimacy. A sense of legitimacy that Tarrow (ibid.) believes is much harder to attain if the movement was to start without a sense of place within the continuity of day to day existence.

This is important in framing the movement’s significance to society, as well as securing space in which to create alternatives that could not be secured from a closed political system. Yet, they themselves do not manifest without a moment that acts as a catalyst that must eventually pass into popular legend so as to command lasting loyalty (Merkl 1986a; Melucci 1989). It is these moments of impetuousness, or ‘madness’ as Tarrow (1993a: 283) puts it, that determine whether or not a movement will engage in direct opposition to the processes of state development. It is in such circumstances that Hobsbawm (1974: 150) believes the movement to be less contrived and more spontaneous. A view, I feel, that negates the strategic nature in which movements seek to engage the state throughout highs and lows of the cycle.

In my opinion, it is in this reciprocal ideological development, that a stratification of centre instigated crisis runs the risk of codifying a peripheral movement’s identity within the processes of collective action itself. The dynamic perpetuation of a cycle of state reform and movement response thus points to the necessity of the state monolith in defining the very ideological strategic base of the peripheral movement as counterpoint to the state.

Giddens (1979: 96) felt it was society in motion, the ever developing dynamic state, which dictates the importance of movement activity in taking on the centre. Almost following on from Foucault’s (1975) pan opticism, Giddens (1979: 96) saw the state as a centreless monolith which was innately inaccessable due to an ability to reform itself according to tactics derived from the institutionalisation of conflict between state and movement. This is why the state is always prepared to reform, as the state in permanent transition is designed to absorb cleavages through repression or co-option (Tarrow 1993b; Tilly 1997). Conversely, it is only through aligning and diversifying the point of attack that movements can attempt to dictate the pace of reform by ‘mimicking’ the actions of the state. This is because the state is a coalition of elite interest groups, as much as the movement is a coalition of oppositional forces (Mitchell 1981; Higley & Gunther 1992). It is within these cleavages that political opportunity structures emerge that may be exploited by a movement willing to expand their repertoire in order to engage the state to react:

The structure of a movement may be transformed in response to environmental pressures, and in some cases the very existence and viability of a movement may be threatened by external elements. The response of groups in power to a movement, and, in particular, the response of social control agencies, is important in determining its character (Anderson & Dynes 1975: 18).

The role of the movement, in effect, is to heighten the reflexiveness of local and global societal communities through increased diversification of political activity. The movement’s role may even be dedicated to accentuating the discreditation of specific governmental structures, but in doing so it still aims to open up more public space for increased public dialogue which is innately democratic (Maguire 1990, 1995). It uses the veneer of social issues to push political platforms that were previously left unaddressed. In this way it may even, in demagogic societies, according to Giddens (1994: 120) a leading structurationist, pave the way for democratisation when it manifests against anti-pluralistic forces. Movements, thus, tend to be the opposite of rigid statist structures in that they are built around more flexible decision making processes; which in itself makes the structure of the movement even more reflexive as it is but a response to the conditions created by the forces that they oppose. Yet, without this rigidity, the reason for mobilisation would not exist, it is hence dialectical, as Giddens (1994: 122) states:

All social change tends to be dialectical; a movement one way usually produces opposing trends also.

Herein lies the attractiveness of social movement mobilisation against the state, as opposed to party political formalisation within the state, in that the multifaceted nature of protest repertoire offers the movement many more extra-state strategic options to affecting revolutionary political change of the entrenched political order (Maguire 1995). The fact that social movement activity can offer a wide variety of protest action, including violence, disruption and convention, signifies its malleability to respond more readily to state engendered changes within the perpetual cycle of reform-protest-reform (Wilkinson 1977, 1987; Tomlinson 1980; della Porta & Tarrow 1986; Wasmund 1986; della Porta 1992b). Movements that are able to grow are those that are able to combine this flexibility in repertoire with a “capacity to embody politically advantageous and culturally appropriate frames of meaning” (Tarrow 1995: 117).

The Periphery’s Response to the State: the Expansion of Protest Repertoires.

The significance of the rise of repertoire is its role as catalyst in the cycle of action-reaction-action which is at the heart of the dynamic relationship between complimentary state and movement development. Della Porta and Tarrow (1986: 611) both seem to feel that this catalyst role lies in the ability of the state to reshape the dimensions of the conflict through restructuring their consolidation in direct response to demands from those previously excluded. In turn, for movements, the repertoire of attack itself becomes an important indicator of their ability not only to survive the current political environment, but also how to influence the state through highlighting the cleavages that exist. It is Tilly (1986: 386) who recognises that movements are children of the conflict that emerge between the state and opposing claimants to power. As a symbol of open contention it is a producer of messages of the intent, capacity and possibilities of the aggrieved group to mobilise against the centre (Melucci 1996). In this sense the movement has developed parallel to that of its repertoire, as the repertoire is but a response to the state’s implementation of power structures (Tilly 1986: 386).

Pasquino and della Porta (1986: 169-172) found that there is a facet to the radicalisation of Italian politics that is heavily linked to attempts by the government to accentuate the incompatibility of reform with progress through initiating the cycle of violence in order to increase the intensity of policing. This is an extension of the rule of the centre and is a tactic commonly utilised by ever threatened elites in order to create the environment responsive to repressive actions. In Northern Ireland, this manifests itself in the co-operation between the state security forces and “illegal” Protestant paramilitaries such as the UVF and Ulster Defence Association (UDA) (Bruce 1992; Dickson 1995). In Spain, it is found in the reidentification of the military with a new Greater Spanish militantism designed to counter the radical Basque national identity forged and defined in the very anti-state militancy of the Basque Land and Freedom Movement (ETA) (Alvaro Baeza 1995b).

The cycle of protest hence becomes a leverage between competing identities that solidify within the conflict. At once competitive and complimentary, this dynamic perpetuation of struggle produces a reassertion of identity that cannot allow one opponent to develop without the other following suit. Central to this ‘mimicking’ is the frame for reciprocal action that the state provides. The dynamic action-reaction-action cycle that underpins state and movement relations has as much to do with political opportunity structures offered by the state in transition as it does with the space that a movement creates by itself (Kriesi 1989; Klandermans 1990; McCarthy & Wolfson 1992). Hence, the importance of the development of cycles to the formation of state and movement relations which tend to combine experiences of shared contributions of past cycles into a mesh that forms the base for new activism (Tarrow 1988; Maguire 1990). It is a situation that allows for a convergence of spontaneity and structure that permits ready elites to exploit them in ways more formalised state opportunity structures could not provide.

In Yugoslavia it allowed for communist elites to exploit nationalist cleavages in order to foster a community strategy otherwise unattainable (Banac 1990, 1992; Dimitrijevic 1995). It is a combination of the spontaneous with the planned that gives the movement an almost organic legitimacy that enables a repertoire to develop in direct response to state strategies of co-option or repression. These “moments of madness,” according to Tarrow (1993a: 283-284);

do not transform the repertoire of contention all at once and out of whole cloth, but contribute to its evolution through the dynamic evolution of larger cycles of mobilisation in which the innovations in collective action that they produce are diffused, tested, and refined in adumbrated form or eventually become part of the accepted repertoire.

It is these political opportunity structures that give an external factor to movement mobilisation that becomes culturally inscribed within the communication structures of society to the extent that it becomes a learned convention of “society’s public culture” (Tarrow 1995: 18). The movement is designed to utilise these political opportunity structures that emerge within the conflict so as to, through a delicate balance of alleviating the initial strain felt by its constituency and ensuring that the divisions remain long enough to be strategically exploited, attain maximum gain from their extra-parliamentary status. What the mass movement offers the disenfranchised, according to Hobsbawm (1973a: 12), is a grass roots alternative to the pre-existing state political structures. This was at the heart of the successful mobilisation of the civil rights and cultural movements in Northern Ireland (Kelly 1972) and Croatia (Johnson 1972; Kesar et al. 1990) throughout the late 1960s and in the Basque Country throughout the 1970s (Conversi 1996).

Frames, Ideas and Ideologies as Modes of Communication, Oppositional Cultural Construction and Reasons for Mobilisation that are Tested and Refined within the Protest Cycle.

One of the banes with Social Movement theory for Tarrow (1992: 174) is that throughout the 1970s and 1980s a great deal of research was conducted into gathering empirical data on the motivations behind those recruited into movements. Yet, not enough was spent on how leaders formulated ideological methods that would eventually be dispersed amongst the throng. Nor why some messages convinced people to take action and others did not. Tarrow (ibid.) raises an even more important question:

do the belief systems and symbols that inspire protesters to take collective action possess autonomous mobilising potential, or are they simply the mechanical expressions of material interest, political opportunity, or power?

The problem is that the literature has failed to analyse sufficiently how collective beliefs are constructed, and how they eventually contribute to planned collective action. The common denominator of all kinds of movement activity is collective action; yet, a sustained interest can only be created through the incorporation of consensus into common meanings and value systems (Klein 1987; Gamson 2988; Klandermans 1988). It is when these political opportunity structures for change offered the periphery by the centre are transformed from potential mobilisation into action that, I believe, these recurring cycles emerge. This again places the state at the centre of the preconditions to collective action. The stimulus is more often than not the response of the state in increasing opportunities for participation, as only when conflict arises does the periphery radically mobilise (Davis 1988; McCarthy et al. 1991; Hill & Rothchild 1992). Tarrow (1995: 191), hence, is correct when suggesting it is the structures of the nation state in transition that supplies the framework for citizenry participation. It is, thus, the corresponding development of crisis between reshaping state centres and reactionary peripheries which provides the cyclical reformulation of crisis necessary for peripheral oppositional mobilisation. The state’s aim is to consolidate, whilst the peripheries is to exploit the conflict so as to justify further resistance.

Poland during the 1980s was an example whereby the government provided the necessary political opportunity structures in order to facilitate separate “civil societies” so as to appease dissident cultural activities within the parameters of the martial state (Misztal 1995: 324). Yet Solidarity itself as a movement was doomed to fail if they had not taken political opportunity structures granted them by the failure of the state to incorporate dissident ideological, social, cultural, nationalist and religious sectors (Laba 1990; Ost 1990, 1994). The framing of the conflict between the ideologically competing Communist Polish state and the Solidarity Movement was integral to extending existing cleavages, through ideologically reinterpreting them, to the centre of the state’s agenda (Stokes 1993: 115-117). Moreover, without the initial moves of the state to reopen channels of cultural and social participation, it is doubtful whether these political opportunity structures for parliamentary reform could have been so readily exploited; even those found within the conflict itself.

Giddens (1979: 6) felt that ideology was to be looked at separately from other epistomological issues which would leave ideology open to be studied in terms of its meaning as a focal point of political mobilisation. Taking this into account I feel that when movements counter established doctrines of ideology, or nationality, they are combating rules of social and cultural mobilisation that are dictated from the centre in order to maintain the established order. The adoption of oppositional or rival identities is, in terms of communication, imperative in asserting an alternate identity; it is a rejection of the state’s right to impose one identity upon the periphery (Snow & Benford 1988; Melucci 1992a). National movements are prime examples of this proffering of the alternative in direct opposition to the views held by the state elite (Burke 1992: 294).

What is interesting about Giddens’ (1979: 11) argument is that the structurationist solution he offers accentuates the fact that the individual has no choice but to follow systems that have institutionalised these cleavages. Thus, suggesting that the sole way to legitimise participation can only be determined within the state structure that created it. It proposes that even the nature of oppositional action is dictated by the centre. Within the movement the alternate identity, hence, provides a structure of political identification, a framing of the conflict, that leads to a variance in the frame of action (Tarrow 1992; Melucci 1995; Zald 1996). As Melucci (1992: 136-137) states:

The role of ideology is that of making sure that the actor comes out of every confrontation with the most positive image possible. In the case of a positive outcome to the conflict, the situation will be symbolically articulated as the very victory of the good and the righteous over arbitrary injustice. In the case of a defeat, ideology will speak of the battle of the weak against the powerful, and of unfair tactics. In either case, ideology intervenes on the behalf of the actor in an attempt to increase the consensus mobilisation.

It is the perpetual cycle of state shaping movement and, correspondingly the movement’s reaction shaping the state’s response, that refines a movement (Koopmans 1993). It is in the process of placing one’s identity or ideology at the centre of the debate that one legitimises the cause within the community they represent (Melucci 1992: 132). Thus, providing space for the centre to create their own ideological movement that intensifies with each action of the periphery against the centre. A reciprocity of identification emerges as competing identities refine their own ideological base within the perpetuation of the cycle, as the individual becomes equated with the historicity of the communal struggle and protest action, but also grants historicity to the state’s identity as protector of the centre. It was a process that, following Hegelian lines, was built upon mutual recognition of the importance that the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ play in creating conflict that leads to a redefinition of the culture of conflict (Kellner 1992: 141). A ‘self’ which is reflexive of the state’s official identity, and is formed within the environment produced by developing state centre and the periphery’s responses. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986: 7-8) point out:

Class, religion, ethnicity, race, or nation do not happen spontaneously as reflections of objective conditions in the psyches of individuals. Collective identity, group solidarity, and political commitment are continually transformed-shaped, destroyed, and moulded anew- as a result of conflicts in the course of which political parties, schools, unions, churches, newspapers, armies, and corporations strive to impose a particular form of organisation upon the life of society.

These frames are then a reference point to measure the success and failures of the movement, as well as its durability, in ‘mimicking’ the state action for action, frame for frame. It is within the cycle of action-reaction-action that is the cause of conflict between centre and movement that these identity frames are refined. The very fact that collective identity itself is based on socio-cultural ties also suggests that there is a hint of the organic within the movement itself, that in turn becomes a symbolic communication of highly articulated interests in circumstances where the cycle of protest shows that access to the state centre for the marginalised group is limited (Melucci 1985, 1996).

This ritualisation of protest action and centre response enables, with each end of a cycle, for the further entrenchment of the centre and peripheral identity (Hoffman 1974; Tarrow 1992). The problem though is with each solidification of both positions, there runs the risk of a stratification of the conflict. The discursive nature of the movement’s ideological formation also underpins the nature of identity formation, or, a discourse that may bring the cultural and political aims of a movement into “constant cohesion” through the ritualisation of the struggle (Fine 1995: 129). This is a redefinition of an established oppositional culture in the case of national movements, according to political opportunity structures attained in the conflict with the state (Tarrow 1995: 119). In this sense it ‘mimics’ the state in recognising the need to ride the cycle in order to keep the community relevant in changing times. Thus the movement is an extension of the community mobilised not vice versa.

Tarrow (1989: 24) finds the search for a more tangible identity in order to sustain public loyalty as significant due to the fluid and transient nature of social movements, suggesting that the “extension of traditional interpretative frames is one of the main mechanisms for the diffusion of a protest cycle.” It is the threat of oppositional forces maintaining some greater link with the population that has pushed social movements to embrace more traditional forms of societal identification (Kertzer 1988), as those proffered by 'New Social Movement' theory seem to be highly generational, and hence transient. This is a problem that is faced by any theory that attempts to apply an ahistorical approach to any study of the social dimension of a movement’s activity (Abercrombie et al. 1992: 116).

Any such ahistorical approach is bound to fail due to the innate link between histories shared within state boundaries and social shifts that occurred world wide in post-industrial societies searching for the social ties lost as a by-product of industrialisation (Hobsbawm 1996: 325-328). The saliency of movements, in comparison to states, lies in their ability to be perceived as framed from the rational choice of their participants. The creation of new frames of engagement, through ritualisation of protest, would promise new means of challenging the established order, without necessarily isolating traditional forms of social organisation (Johnston & Klandermans 1995: 5). The movement, thus, becomes the altar in the church of ambition where hope is laid down to be blessed. In most of these circumstances, movements were seen as the focal point of collective ambitions and desires for betterment and progress.

Conclusion.

In conclusion of this chapter, I find it interesting to recall the findings of William Anderson and Russell Dynes (1975) in their study of the dynamic relationship between state and movement sponsored violence in attaining social change in the May 30 1969 civil rights movement in Curaçao. In their theoretical research, Anderson and Dynes (1975: 14) found that violence, as an aspect of movement protest repertoire, can act as a focal point of mobilisation when a movement, faced by an entrenched conservative elite, can no longer rely on constitutional modes of politicisation in attaining the desired socio-political change. It must be noted, as well, that movements tend to fail when VDA becomes the sole means of attaining their goals due to the constricting nature of political violence and the levels by which the state may utilise such cleavages to further entrench their right to use force as a means of ensuring societal stability (Tarrow 1989; della Porta 1995, 1996). Movements are agents of social change, not the focal point of the commencement of violence, as it is the state that dictates this.

Thus, it becomes imperative to study movements in their entirety as VDA is, like NVDA and party political formalisation, but an aspect of the totality of collective action that is found within an expanded protest repertoire. This is why I agree with Anderson and Dynes (1975: 14) when they say it is important to view a study of movements within the context of three dynamic relationships: the relation between movement and cleavages created in the initial mobilisation, the internal dynamics of the movement itself as it struggles to cope with the strain that comes with challenging state strategies of repression or co-option, and the successful reinvention of new expanded repertoires.

Social movements are but socio-political representatives of increasingly heterogeneous societies that are searching for more complex forms of political representation, as traditional forms of political mobilisation may no longer suffice. It is, hence, within societal problems, within the social and cultural conflicts, that these movements must adopt new strategies in order to either work with, or combat against, the monolith of the state. For it is the state which dictates the terms of the debate through arbitrary laws and constitutional reforms, as much as it is up to the movement to fight for their own inclusion in the processes of state reinvention through political agitation.