Introduction

1)Basque Land and Freedom.

2)From here on in the state, within the context of this thesis, will be defined as the overarching politicial structure of institutions of governance controlled by a numerically dominant parliamentary or governing elite. Thus, the state is the space in which both the centre and periphery seek to redress their claims and counter-claims.

3)The reason I have chosen the term ‘mimicking’ as opposed to ‘mirroring’ implies a passive reflection of another’s movement. Hence suggesting the movement is but a secondary image of the state. ‘Mimicking’ suggests less passivity and greater interpretive free will, as it is an act of repeating the action of the ‘other with the added weight of implementing one’s own interpretation of the initial action. It is thus both an interpretive and critical action. For deciphering the inapplicability of the ‘mirroring’ analogy to a study of dynamic organisations such as nationalist social movements, sue to its innate passivity, I am indebted to my supervisor Dr Diarmuid Maguire of the University of Sydney Department of Government and Public Administration.

4)Throughout this thesis the Movimiento Nacional will be referred to as the Movimiento.

5)Author’s italics.

6)Author’s italics.

7)Author’s italics.

8)The Basque Nationalist Party is the English translation of Partido Nacionalista Vasco, hence the abbreviation PNV.

9)This was due to age of many of those involved rather than the consequences of war. Though as the period of the Croat-Bosnian War of the summer 1993 would prove, war would be the reason for my inability to gain interviews past this date.

10)Meaning ‘Popular Unity’ would become the political wing of ETA.

11)‘Basque Solidarity’.

Chapter I

1)When talking of political opportunity structures I am referring to Tarrow’s (1996: 54) definition of political opportunity structures being the “consistent- but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national- signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movement.”

2)The ‘Long May’ is the term given to the continuous anti-statist social movement activism that emerged throughout Italy in May 1968 that would not end until moves were made to incorporate the Broad Italian Left into the government by the end of 1971 (see Lumley 1990; della Porta 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995).

3)Which will be the subject of Chapters Four, Five and Six of this Dissertation.

Chapter II

1) This will be discussed more fully in chapters 4 and 5 of this Dissertation ,on the development of nationalist movement protest opposition to dynamic state-centre and movement-periphery development.

2) The catch phrase of the French revolution “liberty, egality and fraternity” would encapsulate more ubiquitous demands for wider societal enfranchisement to be undertaken by the national movements of nineteenth century Europe.

Chapter III

No end notes in this chapter.

Chapter IV

1) Though, in the Balkan context, Gramsci (1989: 105) recognised this side of national movements, claiming that the problem with the post-Versaille Yugoslav state was its inorganic structures attempting to withhold the development of communal peripheries that were organic in structure.

2) Though, as Greenfeld (1993b: 49) has pointed out, the concept of the nation in some cases may indeed preclude the formation of the nation state as in the case of the Henrician aristocratic elite’s ascension to power after the battle of Bosforth Field. Whereby, a sense of Englishness, emerged, before the foundation of an administratively definitive English state entity.

3) The prime example of this shift away from nationalist rhetoric once the goal of statehood has been attained has occurred with the election victories in Poland in 1996 and Lithuania in 1994, of party political organisations that are defined along class, rather than national, specific platforms. This, in my opinion, suggests that Tilly (1993b) is correct in pointing to the significance of nationalism’s agency as a movement to societal liberation, rather than a doctrine of established Great Nation-states.

Chapter V

1) The reconquista was the name given to the Catholic revolt against Moorish-Islamic rule and reincorporation of the Iberian Peninsula into Christendom. Populist in nature, the reconquista commenced with the victory of the Christian forces at the Battle of Tours in 732 and was completed with the absorption of the Emirate of Grenada into the Dual Crown of Castile and Aragon. It was to prove an effective tool of mobilisation against the foreign oppressor that would be utilised both against the Ottomans, as well as against the Absolutist integrative state by peripheral national communities of Western Europe (see Wallerstein et al. 1979; Arango 1985: 137).

2) Ur-nazion is a phrase that emerged from the Romantic period within nineteenth century German philosophy. Taking the German prefix Ur, meaning the ‘first’ or ‘prime’, and adding it to the noun die Nazion ‘nation’, it alludes to the notion of the primordial nation. When used by Hegel and Fichte it was often utilised to define those nations that held they were ‘historic’ forebears to the contemporary ‘Great Nation States’ such as the yet to be unified Germans, French and Italians (Tilly 1975b: 10-12).

3) Bauer’s Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Österreich and Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemocratie would be highly influential on Edvard Kardelj, the League of Communist of Yugoslavia official party dialetician, and Tito’s restructuring of the Yugoslav state through implementing a Socialist Federal Republic based on the equality of all constituent nationalities within their republican borders (Brooke-Shepherd 1997: 172).

4) Interview, no.3.

Chapter VI

1) A marriage of revolutionary doctrinism and political enfranchisement that stems from the rise of anti-centralist movements in America from 1775 to 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789.

2) Author’s italics.

3) See, Anthony Smith (1987: 51) on the Uruk rebellion in Sumer against the Zagros mountain tribes in the Third Millennium BC; and Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1969b: 7) on thirteenth and fourteenth centuries European Mediaeval ethnic mobilisation as examples of the innateness of ethnic political mobilisation between centre and periphery in pre-industrial times.

Chapter VII

1) Throughout the rest of this thesis I will utilise the term the ‘Troubles’ to describe the militarisation conflict within Northern Ireland between the Republican Catholic community and the Protestant state elite that has emerged since 1969. Though, colloquial in origin it has become a standard term used to describe the conflict within the literature and amongst the participants themselves as demonstrated in Coogan (1996).

2) The Republic of Ireland.

3) Interview, no. 2.

4) Interview, no. 4.

5) I am indebted to Professor Henry Patterson of the University of Ulster for pointing this out to me in his original examinor’s report of this thesis.

6) This work by a young Captain Frank Kitson would become somewhat prescient as by 1973 the tactics espoused within this work gained from his experiences in fighting for the state against the colonial liberationist rebellion of the Mau Mau would be implemented in Northern Ireland. Kitson’s counter-insurgency would play a key role in radicalising protestant paramilitary’s and escalating the active involvement of the British Army in confronting the IRA directly. His thesis (1960) stated that for a settler society to survive the transitory stages of decolonisation they would have to control the overall cycle of reform-repression-reform through eradicating the periphery’s ability to respond to increased pressures emanating from the centre.

7) Interview, no. 2.

8) Interview, no.3.

9) Interview, no.4.

10) Interview, no. 3.

11) In fact Tim Pat Coogan (1996: 125) would come to call the UDA a ‘mirror’ movement of the IRA, which augments my argument that often the very identity of the state elite is as much formed within the cyclical reciprocity of parallel centre and periphery development. Even, as in the case of the UDA this may be for purely strategic defence reasons.

12) The then member for Wickham.

13) Interview, no. 3.

14) Interview, no. 3.

15) Interview, no. 1.

16) The Green Book (1971) was to become known as the Provisional IRA’s Bible. The Green Book was to play a similar role to Krutwig’s (1963) Vasconia and Zabilde’s (1963) Insurreción en Euskadi in the formulation of the strategy of cyclical engagement of the state. The direct confrontation strategy was to be replaced by that of clandestine urban insurrection steeped in the traditions of combing anti-colonial and urban resistance into a nationalist front defined in direct opposition to the state.

Chapter VIII

1) A shift in strategy to create greater dialogue that Sean Farren, the SDLP’s Justice Spokesperson, intimated to me was the only way that Hume could convince the British of the necessity to include the IRA in any future negotiations. The difficulties Hume faced lay in the unwillingness of the British Army to accept the fluidity of support that exists between the moderates and extremists of the Republican movement. Hume had realised that any ignoring of the IRA would be viewed too simplistic for the cause of the “Troubles” still lay in the ability of the Catholics to trust an Ulster elite that they perceived were ultimately colonialistic in nature (Interview, no. 4).

2) Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland.

3) Interview, no. 4.

4) Interview, no. 3.

5) Interview, no. 2.

6) Interview, no. 1.

7) Interview, no. 3.

8) Interview, no. 1.

9) Interview, no.2.

10) The period when this thesis was completed.

Chapter IX

1) ETA is the abbreviation for the term Euskadi ’ta Askatasuna (Basque Land and Freedom).

2) Castilianisation is to be taken as the historic development of Spanish state centralisation based around the formalisation of the legal codes of the Cortes of Castile and León throughout the Middle Ages during the reconquista. It refers to the cultural, legal, social, economic and political standardisation and consolidation of the monarchist state based around its epicentre at predominantly Castilian Madrid. A socio-political process of integration that would become the core of Spanish state development until the transition to democracy and the Pact of Moncloa on June 15 and October 25 1977 respectively. A Process that David T. Gies (1999: 31) calls an “emergence and evolution of nationalist histiography in Spain.” In no way is it to be associated with the ‘racist’ doctrine established Sabino Arana Goiri at the head of the Basque national movement at the end of the 19th century (called Aranism) in his 1892 publication Bizcaya por su independencia. In fact, ETA as movement has long shed any links with the Basque Right and has adopted a Marxist ideological stance towards radical Basque national revolution. So much so that I propose that contemporary radical Basque Nationalist ideology is a ‘mimic’ of this Castilian centred histiography of Spanish national movement ideology of state.

3) The Basque National Party translates into Spanish as Partido Nacionalista Vasco, hence the abbreviation PNV.

4) Within the Basque Country Euzko Gaztedi has been abbreviated to EGI. This abbreviation is used throughout the Basque Country specifically for the youth wing of the PNV based within the Spanish state, as opposed to those in exile, throughout the Francoist era. It is derivative of the full name of the organisation Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (Basque youth from the interior).

5) Both the ORT and LKI were to form the core of pro-Spanish Leftist terrorist movements that grew out of the discontent with the racial and extreme nationalist rhetoric of the PNV and ETA.

6) Interview, no. 5.

7) Franquismo, is the term given to the bureaucratic nature of Franco’s rule, which became the strategic core of the ideological expansion of bureaucratic centralism upon the Spanish periphery under the direct influence of the cult of Franco’s personality.

8) Solidarity of Basque Workers.

9) Alliance of Syndicates of the Basque Country.

10) Interview, no. 5.

11) Lenda-kari is the official title of the President of the Basque Government.

12) Krutwig published Vasconia under the pseudonym Sarrailh de Ihartza, for security reasons.

13) By 1970 Kominstak (Communist) would shed its Basque nationalist identity to become a pan-Iberian communist revolutionary movement under the name of the Communist Movement of Spain. Due to the traditional strong working class support of the Spanish Communist and Socialist Parties they failed to attract much support outside of the Basque Country. The ridding of their nationalist ideology would also see a sharp decline in their support amongst the Basque population that was schooled in a state repression steeped in nationalist chauvinism, hence the new anti-nationalist rhetoric of ETA-Berri was considered irrelevant to the cause of their collective repression.

14) Interview, no.6.

15) Continuismo, is the term given to the desire of the Falangists and other Rightist parties to continue with the development of franquismo as the central ideology of state once Franco died. The aim was a minimum restructuring of the political system that would incorporate sections of the periphery on the proviso that centralisation and Castilianisation would remain at the heart of the state’s development.

16) Interview, no.9.

17) EE is the abbreviation fir the term Euskadiko Ezkerra, that translates as the Basque Left.

18) Both movements were children of the radical ETA movement and hence embodied two varying strategies of the same militantism. The rise of both movements will be dealt with later in this chapter.

19) Interview, no. 7.

20) Herri Batasuna is the Basque phrase for ‘Basque unity’ and is symbolic of the goals of ETA that are steeped in nationalist and socialist rhetoric, as well as the desire creating a homogeneous national movement in strategy and ideology.

21) Interview, no. 8.

Chapter X

1) Interview, no. 9.

2) The impuesto revolucionario was a tax of 15% placed upon the business class of the Basque Country by ETA. The goal was to create a financial resource that could rival that of the states whilst simultaneously implicating much of the business community to the revolutionary struggle that most opposed.

3) Interview, no. 7.

4) Interview, no. 5.

5) The Liberation Anti-Terrorist Groups is the translation of Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, hence the abbreviation GAL.

6) Basque Solidarity is a translation of the term Euzko Alkartasuna-Solidaridad Vasca, hence the abbreviation EA.

7) Interview, no. 10.

8) Interview, no. 6.

9) Interview, no.5.

Chapter XI

1) Interview, no. 11.

2) Interview, no. 11.

3) The North is the term often given to the predominately Catholic, former Habsburg provinces, of Croatia and Slovenia. In terms of Yugoslav economic development, it is also used as a sarcastic reference to the economic inequality between the wealthier northern Republics and economically deprived southern Republics; as in the ‘Global North’, ie, the First World, and the ‘Global South’ the Second World.

4) Interview, no. 16.

5) Interview, no. 13.

6) Croatian Peasant Party is the translation for Hrvatska Sel¡acka Stranka, hence the abbreviation HSS.

7) Interview, no. 18.

8) The Croatian Democratic Community is a translation of Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, hence the abbreviation HDZ.

9) The Yugoslav Peoples Army is a translation of Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, hence the abbreviation JNA.

10) The Croat People’s Resistance is the translation for Hrvatski Narodni Otpor, hence the abbreviation HNO.

11) The Yugoslav Internal Security Services is is the common English translation for the Croatian and Serbian term Uprava drzavne bezbednosti, hence the abbreviation UDB.

12) The Croatian Liberation Movement is the translation for Hrvatski Oslobilacki Pokret, hence the abbreviation HOP.

13) Interview, no. 14.

14) Interview, no. 13.

15) Interview, no. 19.

16) Interview, no. 17.

17) Interview, no. 17.

18) This information was confided in me by Miko Tripalo during our interview.

19) Interview, no. 18.

Chapter XII

1) The protegé of Ivan Stambolic, whom he met at University, Milosevic followed his mentor from position to position until his own ascendancy to power in 1987. Originally director at ‘Tehnogas’ Petroleum Company and ‘Beobanka’, the central bank of Belgrade, Milosevic would soon become the architect of the new state unitarism that was to emerge from Belgrade in response to the demands for greater liberalisation of the state centre. However, his role as a Serbian nationalist did not truly come to the fore until 1987 (see Djukic 1992; Letica 1996a: 103).

2) From the commencement of his manipulation of the Kosovo myth Milosevic directed much of his energies to ensuring that the rallies were controlled expressions of political discontent, tied to his own ambitions of restructuring the state. The key of controlling the rise of state engendered movement mobilisation was the ‘professional protesters’ employed for these rallies. Consisting, in the main, of the unemployed, Milosevic would pay them in food for attending each rally (Glenny 1992: 34).

3) The utilisation of such blatantly Monarchist symbols was to cause great controversy. In Croatia, the Serbian alliteration of this phrase in the form of four Cyrillic esses placed within a cross was considered a sign of ultra-nationalism. The fears of Serbian hegemonism were further highlighted that the cross and four esses were often placed in the middle of flags carried by Chetnik forces throughout World War Two in areas captured from Croatian Ustasha and Partisan forces. It was a sign that federal equality was far from the minds of the architects of the proposed new Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1994: 213).

4) Interview, no. 19.

5) Garasanin has been recognised as the political father of the “Greater Serbian “ state ideology. A Minister for the Interior between 1843 to 1852, during the reign of Prince Aleksandar Karad¡ord¡evic, Garasanin’s work Nacertanije would provide much of the reasoning behind the expansionist policies of the post World War One Monarchist elite and the World War Two Chetnik movement. It’s main theme was the recognition for the necessity of forming a unitarist state to ensure the continued protected development of all historical Southern Slav national ideological movements into one state entity. At the core was placing Serbian population in the position of cultural, political and social predominance within this new centralist state (see MacKenzie 1985, 1982).

6) Renowned as the philological standardiser of the Serbian language in 1820, Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, would become recognised as the cultural founder of the “Greater Serbian” ideology. Serbs All and Everywhere significance arose from its claim that all Southern Slavonic linguist groups that were similar to contemporary Serbian were derivative of the same people who had come under varying influences after a millennium of foreign occupation. This would be manipulated by successive centralist governments as the cultural justification for the minimisation of the rights of the Croats and other communities to the right of separate national development (see Wilson 1970; Lampe 1996: 61).

7) Interview, no. 11.

8) New Slovenian Art, or Neue Slowenische Kunst, adopted the German phrasing in an attempt to demonstrate their direct opposition to the expansive LCS policies. Amongst the Croats and Slovenes this German phrasing was alluding to the Habsburg origins of the North. The idea was to associate any social and movement activism with the continuous tradition of independent Central European civil societal development. Thus placing peripheral movement development into an historic continuum.

9) New European Order, or Novi Evropski Poredak, would become the Croatian coalition of activists that would employ the similar Central European origins of Croat civil society.

10) Interview, no. 14.

11) Interview, no. 15.

12) Vuk Draskovic was to become the leader of the Serbian Movement for National Renewal which flagrantly utilised Chetnik Movement symbols throughout their public rallies. By the winter of 1996 and 1997 Draskovic would become the democratic hope of Serbia with his involvement in the protest activism that was geared towards removing the Milosevic government in the wake of electoral tampering during the November council elections for Belgrade (see Ramet 1995: 421; Lampe 1996: 340; Tanner 1997: 270).

13) Interview, no. 19.

14) Interview, no. 11.

Conclusion

No end notes in this chapter.