In the previous chapter we examined the inability of the modernists to provide a comprehensive theory of nationalism which links the formation of nation-states to continuing assertions and reassertion of nationalism. Anthony Smith, an ethnicist working within the modernist framework, claims that a theory of nationalism should not be sought, for it is in fact an approach rather than a theory. Adopting this stance in this chapter our aim is to discover what are the common features of the approaches to nationalism as recognised by the ethnicists. The first common feature would be the aim: states to have their own nation and nations to have their own state. The next common feature would be the manner in which they seek to obtain this goal. That is, the nature of the exercise of nationalism. The manner in which nationalism is exercised is unique to each society, but the tools they use are available and common to all. Some tools are just more readily available than others.

In this chapter we will explore issues from the perspective of the ethnicist-modernists (ethnicist will be used in shorthand throughout) and those ideas they regard as primary in discussions concerning nations and nationalism. In the previous chapter it was acknowledged that nationalism was born out of modernity but that the character and motivation of nationalism is located both within and beyond this realm. Moving then out of the confines of the structural elements of modernity we locate issues primarily dismissed or over-generalised by the modernists but embraced by the ethnicists whilst still working within the modernist framework. The modernists possess one set of boundaries and the ethnicists another within modernism. The key element of the ethnicist’s theory is ethnicity as the cultural basis of nationalism. Though not leading naturally or directly to nationhood, it does impact on the shape and content of nations and their nationalisms and provides an instrument useful in mobilising and motivating support towards nationhood.

This chapter will examine the theory presented by the ethnicists and the strengths and weaknesses of their argument. I will examine the importance of the ethnie (that apolitical ethnic component of a community) to the ethnicists and also its value to the European communities – both those who are classified as practising either civic or ethnic nationalism. The value of the ethnie is also important when charting the development of a community from premodern times to the politicised modern age. The relationship of nationalism and ethnicity (a politicised ethnie) will be examined in the second part of this chapter with reference to the presence of chauvinism in some nationalisms, and the importance of the use of time and the content of history. A brief comment will also be made on citizenship.

The Ethnicists and the Importance of the Ethnie
The ethnicists are a milder version of what some term primordialists and perennialists. The latter believe that the nation is not a construct of modernity but an entity that has formed out of the continual developments of society and therefore a natural evolution. Within the category of ethnicists we may include certain segments of the primordialists, though I have deliberately chosen not to explore the primordialists in detail as they verge on examples too extreme to be incorporated in a comprehensive approach to nationalism. The ethnicists do however look to the past and see today’s nation as a part of a perpetual process of self-realisation.¹ Ethnicism, and with it primordialism and perennialism, view the nation as rooted in ethnic groups. Primordialism and perennialism in particular perceive modern-day nations as the natural outcomes of the ethnic communities of the pre-modern stage. This theory is represented by the cultural theories of Clifford Geertz, Walker Connor and John Hutchinson, among others. Culture, according to perennialists, is a continuum transmitting ethnic groupings in history into the nations of modernity, and will continue in some form into the future.

The essence of the ethnicist’s argument is the importance of the ethnie in the exercise of nationalism. Much of the modernist discourse focuses on the relationship of the state to the nation, which subsequently confines the argument to the structural elements of modernity. Examining the nation as a stage in societal development gives the construct better sociological strength and provides an avenue by which to examine the influence of the past to specific nationalisms. The link to past societies or past versions of the current society is via culture and variants of it, which may include the ethnie. The ethnie is an ethnic community – referred to in this discussion as the ethnic component of a community without consideration of whether it has been politicised or not.² Therefore the ethnicists work within the modernist framework acknowledging nationalism to be a product of the structural change that occurred with modernism but also recognising that elements that existed prior to modernity exist within modernity also, without belonging to any apparent form of continuum. That is, nationalism is a wholly modern phenomenon, but nations are not solely such.

An example of an ethnicist is Anthony D. Smith (often set up against his teacher and theoretical foe Ernest Gellner). Smith argues in his text The Ethnic Origins of Nations that the "unitary concept" of a "natural" nation is their ethnic make up.³ Smith’s peg for measuring when nationalism first emerged is not confined to industrialisation, or even to specifically one aspect of modernisation. Instead he uses as a benchmark what he terms the "three revolutions".⁴ These are the transition from feudalism to capitalism (or the revolution concerning the division of labour); the "revolution in the control of administration"; and the cultural and educational revolution.⁵ The latter of which was probably the most fundamental in determining the emergence of nationalism. The process of moving towards nationhood arises out of a crucible of these three revolutions, which, though not explicitly stated, are implied to be modernist in flavour.⁶ However, the characteristics of nations and their nationalisms are found both within these revolutions and in elements existing prior to these revolutions, which have undergone a metamorphosis as a consequence of them. These characteristics are located in a group’s ethnie, as embedded in the culture.

The three revolutions politicised culture, meaning a change in the function of culture within society. The politicisation of culture meant both the elite and the mass were now considered members of the one society, and in particular, sisters and brothers in their own nation. This community-turned-society is united by a common culture, and in practice this common culture possesses elements of ethnicity. In order for a nationalism to be successful it is essential that it utilise these ethnic components. As Smith states:

While this does not of itself lend sufficient weight to a ‘perennialist’ thesis, it does require us to amend ‘modernist’ positions significantly. For it suggests that not only did many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing ethnie and their ethnocentrisms, but that in order to forge a ‘nation’ today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components.⁷

For ethnicists, ethnicity is the key to uniting a group of people and is the social glue of a nation. The main problem they face however is that the best models they have for demonstrating their theory are those nations that formed after the first wave of nation formation. Those formed in this second wave are regarded to have followed the second-route to nationhood, comparable to the classification of ethnic nationalism. These second-generation nation-states not only relied on ethnicity as a binding force, but used the elements of ethnicity to compensate in areas where key features of a developed society, or Gesellschaft, were absent. Using ethnicity in this way meant over-stretching the element to be an all-encompassing instrument attempting to deliver the ultimate goal of a nation-state in whatever way possible. This often meant that concepts relating to ethnicity, such as genealogy, were over-emphasised in their importance. Unable to resort to a political framework these nations used whatever means they had to preserve their identity. In places such as the Balkans these were ethnocultural definitions, but places in Western Europe also fell into this category. Ireland, the Basque and the Catalan cases resorted to religious identification as a method of preservation in response to the victimisation they were experiencing from the centralising authority of Great Britain and Spain respectively. Their exercise of nationalism may differ to examples of Western European countries such as France and Britain, but in the majority of cases they were following the modernist principle of self-determination as an ideology. This was particularly so in Ireland after World War I when self-determination was considered an international right.

The desire to attain the goal of nation-state via ethnicity meant that preserving the ethnie became for some of the utmost importance, culminating into the desire for ethnic homogeneity and supremacy. Obvious examples include Germany during the 1930s and the Balkans in the past decade. Cultural preservation took the most extreme form where culture was totally infused by ethnicity, and the preservation of the ethnie meant the removal of other ethnie by whatever means. In Germany and the Balkans this meant genocide and/or ethnic cleansing. It is easy to see why these nationalisms are classified as ethnic nationalism. But rather than classify them as such, it would be more accurate to say that their exercise of nationalism was ethnic in orientation therefore not denying them the ability to access and exercise civic virtues. The usual presentation of ethnic nationalism precludes the exercise of civic nationalism, and as explored in Chapter One, each on their own constitutes an unsuccessful nationalism (meaning that the goal of nationhood is unattainable in their definitionally exclusive states). Recourse to considerations of ethnic homogeneity and cultural unity is still of significance in the most recent states even when their societies are culturally plural. For new nation-states to emerge successfully some form of cultural unity is necessary, unfortunately it is the insistence that cultural unity take the form of ethnic homogeneity that makes the nationalisms of these states so damaging for this leads to cases of ethnic cleansing and, in extreme circumstances, genocide in order to achieve this type of homogeneity.⁸

Ethnicity cannot be chosen (as say nationality sometimes can) for it is a culture that is bestowed at birth. If a society uses ethnie as the unifying variant of culture then not sharing in the dominant ethnie means exclusion from society. The ethnie is often a last resort option for nations who do not possess a developed high culture that they can use as an instrument of unification. These are often nations whose historical development differed to that of nation-states that have already formed. Historical development differed between Western and Eastern Europe, which meant that the timing and method of the introduction of the features of modernity differed, sometimes dramatically, between the two sides. Theirs was not just a geographical divide but an historical one also. Key variations in the type of changes to the structural elements of modernism include the agrarian revolution that occurred in different ways and to different degrees; the second serfdom was a circumstance experienced by the East but not by the West; industrialisation occurred at different times and again to different degrees between Western areas of Europe and Eastern; and more recently Eastern Europe has experienced communism the while the West was immersed in the principles of liberal democracy. In order to survive in the modern world the ethnie (now politicised in modernism) takes on the attributes of a society, a Gesellschaft, as a consequence of this politicisation.⁹ In the absence of the components that were readily available to the West those in the East had to resort to "alternative models of the nation" and to "different modes of national integration".¹⁰ This often meant resorting to the ethnic characteristics of a group, drawing from the unique features of the Volk. New nation-states do not therefore seek political viability through national citizenship, education, etc., but rather seek it via the avenue of culture, with ethnicity elevated within this. Hence, political legitimacy arrives through cultural affirmation.¹¹ This inevitably perverts the ethnicist’s theory as it posits ethnicity above culture rather than a description of it and so aligns it with the classification of ethnic nationalism.

It is such a convolution of the ethnicist’s theory that has seen its relevance pertain to only ethnic nationalism. Where, in the absence of those elements that have provided the basis for the ‘first’ modern nations, or in scenarios where they are not as eminent in the concept of a nation, such as citizenship, legal codes and institutions, ethnic concepts of the nation have acted as substitutes. Ethnic demography is "the basis of the unit in question" and the "ethnic conception produced a counterpart of that ideal of citizenship to which territorial nations had resorted."¹² Additionally, in allowing for a fellowship between the mass and the elite ethnic nationalism has involved a popular and mass mobilisation. The populism has emerged as a product of their interaction and contingency upon one another (i.e. they were dependent upon one another to progress which in turn is a modernist concept).¹³ Thus the problem for the ethnicist’s theory is that it is reduced to being a populist description of ethnic nationalism rather than a comprehensive explanation of nationalism.

More recent empirical examples may to some extent undermine (or misshape) the theory of the ethnicists. Specifically, examples of nationalism in the past decade have been particularly ethnic in flavour to suggest that ethnic nationalism does exist and the ethnicist’s theory promotes this. This ultimately crowds out the essential elements that form the principles of civic nationalism. It is primarily issues of self-determination, and the formation of nation-states based on this that has directed the focus on issues of ethnicity acting on behalf of culture. This was the case of the new nation-states that formed out of the former Yugoslavia, and is the case now of the Kosovars in the rump Yugoslavia. Interestingly, these areas did experience at particular times some form of autonomy within the political space of Yugoslavia. However, the removal or reduction of this autonomy, as when Milosevic revoked the status of autonomy from the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in Yugoslavia, served to threaten the cultural preservation of these units and provoked Kosovo in particular to seek complete autonomy in order to preserve and affirm their self-determination and this self-determination is based on their ethnic differences to the dominant culture in that society.. The Basque region is also an exampled of an autonomous region within the political space of Spain, likewise Scotland and Wales possess some autonomy within Great Britain. This autonomy is not fixed and the terms are often adjusted to meet the requests of the region to ensure cultural (and political) preservation without immediately threatening the existing form of the political space.

Many of these regions are ethnic and/or religious minorities within larger nation-states. As they develop to become politicised societies, their demands increase also. In this way, particularly since the end of the Cold War, these ethnic minorities are forming nation-states founded upon their ethnicity. Many of the republics of the former Soviet Union formed in this way, and it was perhaps the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that set this post-Cold War trend for political recognition to be bestowed in this way. Their demands for self-determination over-stretched itself to become demands for international political recognition. Ethnicity was quickly elevated to identify not just communities, but be the form of identification for whole societies. Elevated to such an extent political recognition did not seem like such an extreme request. Interestingly, the Bosnian Muslims were not even formally recognised as an ethnic minority in Yugoslavia until the early 1970s. There are instances where Muslim was used as an ethnic rather than religious identification in Bosnia throughout the past century, but it was not until 1972 that they were formally recognised as such (and importantly culturally and politically). Their demands for self-determination were minimal until they came under threat in the late 1980s and early 1990s by neighbouring ethnic communities. Here is a case of a small ethnic community skyrocketing in less than a generation to a level where political self-determination is a reality.¹⁴

The impact of ethnicity as stressed by the ethnicists is important despite its occasional overuse. With a more recent historical example, the revival of nationalism since the end of the Cold War is particularly ethnic in character, but not because ethnicity is at the core of nationalism or that ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ are being uncovered and are now erupting. Rather, as each society is at a different moment of history each must use the instruments at hand to achieve the ultimate goal of a nation. From those experiencing nationalism now (as a hand-me-down version of nationalism) ethnicity is both the ‘natural’ unitary concept, and almost solely the most useful instrument for political and social mobilisation. But this is where the role of ethnicity should be limited. It is precisely an instrument of mobilisation but should not be the sole guarantor of the establishment of a nation-state. Ethnic homogeneity does in no way guarantee this. Development of an education system, literacy, government, infrastructure, a functioning economy – characteristics of civic nationalism – is what, combined with the motivation that ethnicity provides, will deliver the nation-state.

It appears paradoxical that in order to achieve nationhood comparable to the civic model there is a need to create what is absent from what tools are present. This means that one’s ethnic traits must be used to create a unique history, a common culture and the myths that make it such and their role must be expanded beyond an ethno-cultural form to a measure of citizenship.¹⁵ It is as if a community playing political ‘catch-up’ must create the necessary ingredients in order to achieve the final sought after product of a political community united by a common element. The ethnicists use of ethnicity is broad and gives it value. They suggest that the ethnie determine the character of modern nations and the nature of nationalism, which is to be honoured by the elites when they use it to achieve their short-term goals.¹⁶ This is not so different to the modernists who regard culture, but not ethnicity, as the element that casts the flavour of nationalism (for example, Gellner’s high culture). This in turn effects the instrumentalist approach. However, the weight attributed to ethnicity differs between the modernists and the ethnicists. Ethnicity to ethnicists is the core of the cultural thread that ties the past to the modern age, culture is equated with ethnicity, but to those actors in modernity ethnicity is reduced to being merely a tool of influence rather than deliverance. Culture is the key link between the two camps. It is instrumental to both in determining nationalism and the nature of nationalism.

The theoretical classification of ethnic nationalism as a representation of the ethnicist’s theory, suggests not only an alternative route to nationalism, but also a route that in order to catch-up must by-pass some of the key features of ‘Western’ nationalism. In this way it may be regarded as a last resort option (that is, a last resort towards nationhood). The ethnicists, however, refuse to confine their theory as a consolation prize or theory of last resort proclaiming that their theory goes beyond this. Ethnic roots are important to all nationalisms and the key element to a unique culture. This only manifests itself into ethnic nationalism when ethnic characteristics are used for purposes beyond uniting and differentiating culture. When the key feature of culture is the ethnie, cultural politicisation sees the use of the politicised ethnie as a means to achieve a political end. The politicisation of the ethnie involves using the ethnie and adopting territorial components in order to emulate a civic model to some extent. The problem generates when ethnicity is such a focal point that it is no longer the ethnie being politicised but politics being ethnicised. Therefore the fundamental weakness with the ethnicists’ theory is the often-overemphasised ethnic element of culture to the extent that it replaces culture in the theory of nationalism. Perhaps due to the virtual disregard of ethnicity by the modernists, the ethnicists make such a point of emphasising it.

Ethnicity and Nationalism
What role does ethnicity itself play? As mentioned previously it acts as a social glue in uniting a group of people via the vehicle of culture and also providing a method by which to distinguish one culture from the next. Ethnic differentiation becomes very particular when a cultural distinction is attempted between two very similar neighbours, for example the Serbs and Croats, the Russians and Byelorussians. This drive towards differentiation becomes paramount as a consequence of cultural preservation and assertion. In its politicised form, the drive towards cultural preservation and ethnic differentiation becomes a pursuit for the establishment of nationhood and manifests itself into nationalism. In order for an ethnie to survive in this modern world it must politicise, whether it is pursuing the establishment of its own nation or not, and/or whether it is seeking independent statehood. So "the old classical notion of a transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft finds confirmation in the more limited but vital sphere of ethnicity". ¹⁷

The internal need to preserve one’s culture grows into a state where cultural differentiation is demonstrated in a variety of ways, no longer just culturally (and therefore ethnically as it is ethnicity that often describes the culture). To enclose this new political community, and separate it from any cultures that threaten to dilute it, a nation is sought to act as protector of a fragile cultural element, whether this element be religious, dialectical or otherwise. For example, Irish nationalism, categorised both as a rural and as a religious nationalism used religion in order to protect and preserve its culture from the threatening authority of Britain. Differentiation is needed politically and economically also to ensure total preservation from the threat of external cultures. Nationhood is an assertion of independence and equality amongst other cultures already recognised in this modern form. But why the need for differentiation? And is it internally or externally determined?

The need for differentiation is more a case of a cultural assertion that arises out of the desire to preserve the current state of a community as it transforms into a society (that is the process of Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft). When faced with change, particularly such as that heralded by the age of modernity, the immediate reaction is to preserve what remains, but this change can arrive in may other ways also such as invasion or war. This means cultural preservation, and as culture becomes deferential to other factors of modernity, and the weaker, smaller or just unfortunate cultures assimilate into the more dominant ones, cultural preservation and differentiation becomes more pressing.

If cultural differentiation is internally determined then so too is nationalism, determined by either the mandate of the elite or by the will of the mass (the Volk). However this assumes that nationalism is only a case of cultural assertion, but there are political and social pressures to be considered also. This sets nationalism as just a consequence of subjective changes with no consideration of the objective features.To ethnicists it is a case of internal self-determination, where differences are located according to those chosen by the elites or the mass of that culture. Often when something is internally determined and consciously elected, the most obvious and malleable tools are used, which is ethnicity. This alleges that nationalism is subjectively determined. Nationalism is, particularly as an ideology, both objectively and subjectively determined. Ideology is the relationship between the objective and subjective,¹⁸ thus the ideology of nationalism is about the objective and subjective relationship(s) that go on within a society. A nation is lived as more ‘natural’ than nationalism. A nation is a society framed politically, but it is nationalism that describes the nature of relationships within and without this society and how they are played out. It is this that distinguishes one society from another.

Tom Nairn, a Marxist, but with hints of perennialism, regards internal self-determination as a reaction to the goings on of the surrounding states. His theory assumes the existence of historic ethnic communities – which is essentially a perennialist/ethnicist assumption. From this his theory states that elites in peripheral areas were faced with the advancement in the metropolitan centres of Western Europe as a result of industrialisation. Not wanting to be left behind these elites in the peripheral regions emerged as a new intelligentsia that then mobilised others (which included the Volk). The tools of this mobilisation were the unique characteristics and particularities of their community, their ethnos. Thus the uneven development of the social and structural formations of industrialism, capitalism, economics and the market that necessitated the elite of the peripheral areas to mobilise the Volk by nationalising them in order to deliver them to progress. The masses became a necessary component with the "project of creating nations"¹⁹ and were given "for the first time definite form and a clear role."²⁰ And since they were a necessary component, elements of popular appeal were indispensable in mobilising them, which meant drawing from that which the masses could most easily and clearly identify with – themselves.

The ethnicists see the nation as a ‘natural’ evolutionary phenomenon developed out of ethnic groups – they identify continuity between the agrarian and industrial eras. Benedict Anderson, a modernist, recognises the need nations have to develop a never-ending past, but does not regard the nation as an organic development. Instead, with the onset of modernity, the needs of groups still needed to be met, but the instruments used in pre-modern times, namely religion, were no longer available to the same extent. Communities needed a vehicle by which they could maintain a sense of immortality.²¹ Their history and their memory provided the means of immortality and their culture provided the sense of everlasting life.

Chauvinism
Due to the virulent nature of nationalism in the twentieth century, particularly since the end of the Cold War, nationalisms classified as ethnic are often viewed as the evil head of the two-headed monster of nationalism – Nairn’s Janus that continually looks towards the past.²² Consequently such nationalism is aligned with chauvinism. Chauvinism is an "ego-enhancer."²³ Thus those with low self-esteem for whatever reason are likely to be more attracted to chauvinism. Ramet is correct in identifying that groups that display chauvinistic characteristics are additionally attractive to members as they provide a "route to social bonding."²⁴ Having an enemy, or defining an out-group as inferior, also provides for a sort of "social glue".²⁵ Those who are attracted by these features are those most likely to "gravitate" towards false consciousness particularly in the absence of a civil society. The suppression of civil society in the former communist societies and the superego of the communist regimes constituted part of the present national phenomenon in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately only negatively. In this respect the perspective of the "return of the repressed" prevails.²⁶

By defining out-groups chauvinism also describes in-groups "which thus provides a ready-made basis for interpersonal identification and group solidarity."²⁷ Those lacking a social framework, particularly those that have been subject to a collapse of a socio-political system, are vulnerable to the "remedy" of chauvinism with the creation of enemies, or "out-groups" in order to strengthen the "in-group". Unfortunately a common "out-group" throughout the former communist countries of Europe are the Roma. With no membership of their own nation they are often denied the civil, political, economic, social and often human rights that national citizenship bestows. They are a common enemy to various regions of Europe. Violence towards the Roma is prevalent in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, where their presence is threatening to the dominant ethnic communities. These new societies are seeking to reassert their legitimacy in the postcommunist era and reducing that to chauvinism is easily exercised on an obvious and immediate out-group such as the Roma.²⁸

Elites use ethnicity as an instrument of manipulation and mobilisation, but this is only its utility in its reductionist form. It may be a deliberate tool used by elites and almost certainly manipulated by chauvinists. In fact, elites that choose to use ethnicity as a tool to further their own objectives are themselves chauvinists. Chauvinism is often a "part of a strategy designed to mobilize group hatred and resentment" formulated by the elites in order to shift attention away from whatever real issues the elite want to avoid – "to create artificial issues that will deflect public attention".²⁹ This is truer when discussing the utility of ethnicity in the nationalisms of the twentieth century, but is not the case for all nationalisms, and only serves to detract from the real meaning of the ethnicist’s theory. Certainly elites may use ethnicity in this fashion – but this is not its only service.

Chauvinism of a specific ethnic-national character focuses primarily on the "promotion of a myth of threat to the nation"; the "perpetuation of notions of a hostile conspiracy"; and "a persistent tendency of glorification of the national past".³⁰ A good contemporary example is the situation percolating for the past decade in the Balkans. The leaders of Serbia and Croatia provide apt examples of modern-day chauvinistic leaders using ethnicity to further their own objectives. The glorification of the past is embraced by Serb mythologists and Slobodan Milosevic (leader of Serbia), for example the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, where the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman invasion.³¹ This same battle promotes the myth of a threat to the nation and perpetuates the notion of a hostile conspiracy against the Serb people. The Serb leadership has used this myth as deliberate government policy to influence public opinion towards a paranoia and distrust of all non-Serbs. Whatever is foreign is threatening, born from the seeds of Kosovo six hundred years ago.

Franjo Tudjman, leader of Croatia, emphasises the use of national energies in order to combat Serb threats, other policies are not considered useful and "any efforts to highlight other social needs, such as legislation to protect gender equality, is covert treason."³² The elites and leaders in this fashion steer the moral order of the society. Anything that is not in tune with "saving" the nation "is automatically defined minimally as moral decrepitude, if not treason."³³ Though ethnic hatreds and chauvinism are present in Eastern Europe, this does not suggest that they were there all along. Those who argue that what is occurring in the Balkans is a consequence of "ancient ethnic hatreds" are then "positing ethnic hatred and chauvinism as eternal verities" only for the East Europeans and not for all humankind.³⁴ Other chauvinists include Hitler in the past attempting to rid Germany of the Jews, and Zhirinovsky more recently promising to cleanse Russia of Muslims.

Chauvinism offers a "release from stress, an escape from the cruel…to a realm of irrational fantasy".³⁵ Thus once chauvinism is included in the equation of the theoretical classification of ethnic nationalism, any nationalism that is placed into this category is then accused of irrationality. But why is this irrational path then chosen? What functions does it perform for the individual and the community?³⁶ It has to do with the psychological implications of modernity and the emotionalism associated with the ethnicity, particularly in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Cold War where there is a search for some common social and intimate identity far removed from its communist past.³⁷ This search for a post-communist identity has been so powerful as to require the dismantling of any suggestions that communism ever existed in the region. From the removal of statues of past leaders such as the great Lenin statues in the former Soviet Union; to the renaming of buildings, streets, towns and cities throughout all of Eastern Europe; to the complete dismantling of countries such as the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the break in these cases having occurred along the only cultural lines that exist, these being ethnic.

There is no universal "quest" for identity, the search for identity is not continuous, and national identity belongs to no apparent form of continuum.³⁸ Identities can be multiple but in the modern era the national identity becomes the primary one. Identity is what lends purpose and it is memory that provides identity through psychological depth and substantiality. Memory serves as tools by which a collective can take form as one united society. A collective needs a common past to have a common destiny. A shared memory is the subjective element of a nation. This is what provides for the passionate identification with the nation by the individual citizens, as opposed to "only a generalised calculating loyalty to the state." ³⁹

Time and History as Content
The state of the culture and its response to change means that each nation, and potential nation, is liable to experience different histories. Thus the onslaught of modernisation has had varied effects contingent upon what tools each entity had to combat and to deal with. Divisions then occur along historic lines. Focusing solely on Europe, these divisions are sometimes congruent with the geographic divisions and perpetuate the East-West divide of nations and nationalisms in geographic terms. Ideally it would be a case of historic classification instead of division. For the ethnicists history supports their perennial claims, for the modernists it is the basis of myth. It is through the use of history that the ethnicists see the nation as the search for "collective immortality",⁴⁰ where ‘history’ becomes the focal point. The way in which the history is remembered provides for the nature of collective memory within a society, often a malleable tool used by the elite to manipulate and mobilise.

The experiences in Western Europe that led the way towards the pursuit of nationhood (in this instance we will recognise Smith’s three revolutions as these experiences) arrived much later and unevenly in Eastern Europe leading to a different pursuit of nationhood by them. The nation is an integral element of modernity (though itself not a direct product of it), and the trend towards this pursuit as an exercise of progress was set by Western Europe. Eastern Europe strove for the same goals, and attempted to emulate Western Europe in the achievement of them. Since the histories were different, and the East was to some extent playing a game of catch-up, the process towards creating a political entity of the nation by the East was "a thoroughly conscious programme of mass education and propaganda by the new faction of nationalists".⁴¹ This new faction of nationalists was made up of the intelligentsia and elite in general. But this struggle towards statehood by different ethnie under this programme "bred a reaction among more educated sections of the culturally different lower strata".⁴² Due to the differences in experiences the path towards the goal of progress, via the formation of nations as the units by which to progress, the path taken by the East differed to that of the West. Because most of the empires of the East that pursued nationhood were not structured as those of the West, they were left to use the components they had and remained of some use. This meant "the increasing recourse to ethnic, especially linguistic, criteria, crossed however with historical memories of former statehoods in the area." ⁴³

The adoption of vernacular languages as languages of the state was one important step in inviting the Volk to share in the affairs of the state. They were now members, citizens, of the same political unit as the elite. The use of language - both the administrative languages (important to the elite) and vernacular languages (important to the masses) - adds to the stimulation of nationalism. Administrative languages were important in that it made possible the imagining of some unity and homogeneity by the educated classes. But it was the shift to using vernacular languages in the conduct of state affairs that welcomed the masses into the political fold. Even the use of language today is perceptive of nationalism today, particularly those with an ethnic character. Use of this language is indicative of what nationalism of an apparent ethnic inclination can inspire. Again, this reduces the ethnic component in nationalism to only an irrational and emotive tool open for abuse.

Ethnicity in nationalism is so prominent in this Post Cold War period not just for its alleged upsurge and emotive appeal to the people, but for the recognition bestowed upon it by the wider international community. Nation-states are being recognised not by any formal development of a set of legal codes and institutions that separate one region from another state. Rather groups defining themselves ethnically and seeking self-determination upon these grounds are given legitimacy, against the auspices of the Charter of the United Nations. By legitimising groups this way (and in no way has there been a uniform method of recognition) the international community is endorsing societies formed in this manner and encouraging them to continue to do so.

A Brief Comment on Citizenship
As the motivation, struggle and pursuit of nationhood and statehood gained momentum incorporating more segments of society, and as these segments slowly began to learn their role and become active members in this new entity, they were in fact contributing to the development of a citizenry and their own citizenship. "Essentially, ‘citizenship’ conveyed the sense of solidarity and fraternity through active social and political participation."⁴⁴ However, territorial nationalism, and also the actual practice of citizenship, indicates a shift away from the theoretical concept of citizenship – or rather away from the authority and sovereignty of citizenship based solely on social and political participation. There is the

assumption that the will to participate…was predicated upon an attachment to the land and an affiliation with the community, a sense of brotherhood which could only be found among those whose parents (and perhaps grandparents, even ancestors?) had done so.⁴⁵

This suggests that citizenship in practice does not exist in a pure ideal-type form, as it possesses concepts that move beyond the rational notion. It is true however, that citizenship is far stronger in theoretical cases of territorial and civic nationalism than in ethnic nationalism. When applying the ethnicist’s theory to some of the earlier examples of nations and nationalisms, they are faced with the counterforces of the strength of citizenship set up against the mandate of ethnicity.

Conclusion
The ethnicist’s are constricted by the absence of some elements in their theory or by the over-emphasis of others. Consequently, their theory is reduced to being a description of the ideal-types of ethnic nationalism and thus serves to perpetuate the dichotomy of civic and ethnic nationalism, rather than reconcile the two in one comprehensive theory or approach. In short, the two types of nationalism sprang out of the different experiences of nations in their path towards nationhood and statehood. These differing paths were largely determined by the condition of the culture prior to the changes that occurred throughout the societies and hence their differing reactions to change. Thus the different histories shared by different regions divided their nationalisms into East and West – or in a more simplified manner – civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.

What the ethnicists are promoting is the notion that each nationalism has a cultural basis (agreed by the modernists also). This cultural basis is unique to each group according to their culture prior to the changes that occurred over a few centuries (whether directly from modernisation or a combination of Smith’s three revolutions). This culture was that which was carried by the ethnie; that is, the ethnic component of a group is what differentiated them from the next group, and any remnants of this that were carried into the new age have become the politicised ethnie that characterises each respective nationalism. That is the perennial feature of nationalism, though nationalism itself is purely a product of the modern age. The politicised ethnie is not a nation but is that component of a culture and so of a nation, and hence its nationalism, that helps to distinguish it from the next.