Post-Cold War events have brought factors to the surface that are almost demanding to be recognised when examining the roots and influences of nationalism. Namely, ethnicity, emotionalism and post-emotionalism, the importance of a civil society (and not just democracy), the differences between rural and urban cultures within modernity, and the differences in consciousness amongst different peoples. Identifying the broader elements of modernism and the generalisation of culture provides for a greater opportunity in incorporating elements important to the nationalist discourse that may have formerly been disregarded by the modernists as irrelevant but now allows for the introduction of elements pertaining to the ethnicist’s thesis into this equation.

The nation is a form of social integration. Nationalism provides the movement and process towards the autonomy and unification of one society and is the reassertion, support and preservation of the culture housed by this society in a national identity. Each route taken towards nationhood and nation formation is unique, or at least each individual group would like to believe theirs is unique. In fact each nationalism does contain its own unique combination of characteristics often represented by the ideals of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism (remembering these are not the only pressures on the theory of nationalism). Ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are ideal types not found in isolation in practice. It is therefore false to label or set up the series of dichotomies that is built-up from this for it is "both normatively and analytically problematic." ¹

We have looked at the principles of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, and their intermeshing. The radical modernists and the ethnicist-modernists have been examined along with their respective correlation to civic and ethnic nationalism. This chapter will finally look at those elements that determine that an interplay must exist between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. We will observe the objective and subjective elements of nationalism for nationalism is subjective, but nationalism is the objective exercise of it, consequently. Nationalism contains factors beyond and within the realm of rationalism and has the possibility of a powerful emotional appeal which provides for its psychological depth. It is also a movement not confined to areas where modernity has taken on full force – it exists in industrialised urban areas as well as in rural areas. Because of this diversity this chapter will conclude the thesis with the claim that for nationalism to be practised successfully an intermeshing of the principles of civic and ethnic nationalism is necessary.

Objectivity Versus Subjectivity
The paths that peoples have followed or pursued towards modernity are determined by the nature of the social context and the make-up of the group prior to the onset of modernity. These two points are the important clues to firstly the core and then the perpetuation of nationalism. The onset of modernity is over-determined by the way the various structural elements of modernism were introduced - the unique combination of factors that implanted itself onto this group to introduce it to modernity. These structural elements are in this way objective factors acquainting groups with modernity, hence also with nationalism. By objective features I am referring to these elements determined by situation and circumstance, such as the onset of modernity. However the nature of the nationalism is determined not only by the nature of the modernity, but also by the type of group it is infecting. These are the subjective features defining the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state, and the society and the state. It has more to do with perceptions. How a group adopts the pursuit of nationhood (and in fact whether they pursue it or follow it at all), and how they react to its features leads to the development of this group’s own unique nationalism. It is this that determines the subjective features of nationalism and the variance between the subjective features of different nationalisms. Therefore societies and nationalisms are congruent in their objectivity but differ in the phenomenal experiences of their subjectivity. That is, a citizen of France is regarded as a member of a nation-state, just as a citizen of Germany is internationally recognised as such. The generalised objective determination is the same in both cases. The method of incorporation used by each nation-state does not effect a citizen’s status externally. That is, though the method of membership to society differs in France and Germany – i.e. the subjective features of their society differ – the objective features (in the context of nationality) do not.

In practice each nationalism has both objective and subjective elements. The objective features are those determined by the existence of a state and its features that includes economic resources, population size and make-up, infrastructure, etc. The subjective elements are "memory, value, myth and symbolism"² –these give us an insight to the national character and "distinctive qualities" of a national community. Any subjective elements are dependent upon people’s understanding of them. Concepts like tradition and modernity contain a subjective element to them and contain a utility as "cultural constructs".³ It is the subjective features that expose a stronger relationship to political conflict than the objective. This would account for the accusations of ethnicity, a predominantly subjective element, leading to conflict or more generally, ethnic nationalism being regarded as the more violent nationalism. This however is an over-generalisation, but we can admit that the subjective elements of nationalism, whether they be the ethnic components or otherwise, to lend it to be more vulnerable to emotion and conflict. ⁴

Modernisation theory fails to reconcile the objective with the subjective, though both Gellner and Nairn claim that it is precisely the objective that determines the subjective. In fact, the objective element is the vehicle that introduces a population to nationalism, and carries the subjective element that is determined by forces beyond that only of modernity. Thus, the roots of nationalism do lie in modernity, but the elements that fuel the continuation of nationalism are located beyond modernity. In addition, the characteristics that distinguish one nationalism from another are determined by factors unique to each individual group, and it is these subjective factors that will govern whether nationalism carries a predominantly civic, ethnic, emotive, violent or a placid orientation.

What is more critical is the strength or weakness of a society that will determine the impact of subjective and objective elements. A strong society is one that is "capable of defending itself against tyranny in whatever form it might take"; a weak society is one "that is not capable of such self-defense."⁵ The functioning of a society is more important than that of the state for it is the society that determines the ultimate direction of its members. Ramet states:

an intolerant society is more threatening to the preservation of personal autonomy than an intolerant state. For in the intolerant state the individual is unfree in the political sphere but autonomous, perhaps even in some sense "free," in the social sphere. In an intolerant society, however, probably regardless of the specific institutional forms of government, the individual is unfree in society itself, and without freedom in society no constitutional provisions for the political sphere can make much difference.⁶

Not only is societal strength consequential but so too is the presence of a civil society. A civil society is a "set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society."⁷ It is Leviathan’s antithesis and as such is unlikely to exist in a developed form in the presence of an authoritarian regime. With the collapse of authoritarian rule there is the potential for a civil society to emerge, particularly if the region has had some experience in the past with a democratic culture conducive to the development of a civil society. Unfortunately this is not the case with many regions in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the Czech Republic and Poland to some extent can claim to have experienced versions of democracy in their history, as discussed in Chapter Three. Consequently the development or emergence of a civil society may be completely different.

It will be accepted that a strong society is one with a civil society present. A civil society is less likely to be vulnerable to change and unlikely to be present in a weak society. The extent of the impact of changes on a society will ascertain the changes that occur within society and whether these changes are substantial enough to alter societal attitudes. If they are then this suggests an alteration in the relationship between culture and politics within the society, which can then lead to the people of the apparent threatened culture seeking political self-determination if the culture is perceived to be threatened by them. This in turn is liable to manifest itself into nationalism. The cultural threat may arise not just from societal change or breakdown, but also as a consequence of the dominance of an alien culture. This was certainly the case with the Republic of Ireland reacting against the dominance of the British Empire, likewise with the Basque region in Spain. A recently overt case is that of the Bosnians of the former Yugoslavia. Bosnian ambitions for their own state may not have existed so actively were it not for the strength of Serb aggression and expansionism.

Note also that it is not the weakness of a society itself that will spur on change, rather it is the degree of weakness that is likely to make a society more vulnerable to both internal and external factors. Adopting Ramet’s guidelines, external or objective factors that may contribute to cultural change and differentiation include the mobilisation of new groups, "the defection of the intellectuals" and "inefficiency and corruption in the system". The subjective factors, those that are internally determined, are the "loss of credibility by the regime", "the loss of self-confidence by the ruling elite and the appearance of fissures and fractions within that elite" and "the inept use of force".⁸ Economic deterioration of a society may be either a subjective or an objective element, depending upon the way economic circumstances are construed by any given society.

It is perhaps the subjective internally determined factors that are most suggestive of change within a society, and the cultural permutations that take place for it is changes in perceptions, changes in subjective elements that will instigate changes in the structural elements of society. Reiterating Smith’s identification of "memory, value, myth and symbolism" as the distinctive subjective features of a community, we can locate that which motivates nationalism. Myths are perhaps the most indicative and insightful to a society’s nationalistic direction. Myths are needed for external consumption and internal mobilisation. The elites use myths, and fashion new ones, "by their own ideals and the logic of the ethnic situation",⁹ to successfully steer the society along the quickest path to nationhood. When the road is to be short, the elite will use whatever is most malleable and popularly appealing to divert attention from other issues and achieve their goal. The most direct route to generating popular mobilisation is to appeal to the emotions of the people.

Emotionalism and Reductionism
Perhaps the most contentious issue that the modernists struggle with is the emotive element of nationalism, or as Nairn refers to it, the "spell". Both Nairn and Gellner have attempted to reconcile this issue.¹⁰ As already mentioned, to the modernists the subjective elements of nationalism are determined by objective factors, namely the economic forces of modernity, but not necessarily wilfully or deliberately.¹¹ For example, the uneven development of industrialisation was not deliberate but it objectively determined the direction, or fates, of various groups, from centre to periphery. But this does not explain what determines the nature of these subjective elements that all too often fuel nationalism beyond the realms of rationale and reason.

The process of nationalism may be described by the modernists, but the appeal that draws people to nationalism, its substantiality, and that which provokes emotion and sometimes violence is encapsulated by the ethnicists. They explore the psychological and emotive explanations of nationalism. It is this that carries the "spell" that Nairn refers to and provides "emotive authority".¹² This is located in the non-elite, the masses, including the peasants. Within modernity the elite and the mass, both belonging to the high culture, rationalise their motivations, aspirations and frustrations through the exercise of nationalism. However, even in the discussion on ethnic nationalism, the psychological aspects of nationalism are not traversed deeply enough. Nationalism has such psychological depth and provokes such emotion not because of the particular national identity an individual may have, but the fact that the individual must partake in the process of identification.¹³ This process is a political one, which thus introduces the individual to political activity, and to the exercise of nationalism.

Indeed the emotive element of nationalism is potent to the virulent nationalism experienced in the twentieth century, particularly in the form of postemotionalism. Postemotionalism is "the manipulation of emotionally charged collective representations of ‘reality’ on the part of the culture industry" and "an improvement on postmodernism" – (Mestrovic, who keyed the term postemotionalism, believes theories of postmodernism have neglected emotions and their impact, particularly on the mass society).¹⁴ It mixes emotional memories with mythical historical events. But this does not fit into the modernist camp, ruled by the values of the Enlightenment marked by rationalism and the regard of emotionalism as insensible and of no value.¹⁵ Nationalism is not a rational entity, but it does represent a process towards rationality. It is the process by which the emotional is turned into the rational. Irish nationalism may be such an example, particularly as its nationalism is ceasing to be regarded as irredentist but representative of a new and revised civic form of nationalism. Consequently, theories of nationalism must include both explanations for the rational and the emotional.

A further reason as to why the modernists are not all embracing of the emotive element of nationalism is the disagreement in reducing nationalism to this level. Gellner is anti-reductionist, particularly concerning nationalism, and those that reduce nationalism to the "[s]tanding of being the emotive manifestation of social concerns" and certainly nationalism is far too complex to be reduced to this.¹⁶ Gellner’s point constitutes part of his rebuttal of the ethnicists. Gellner does recognise that the emotive element should be acknowledged when examining nationalism, but his own construct of modernity, built on the "raw materials" of culture and organisation which in turn generates nationalism, is suspiciously absent of any explanation of the emotive element of nationalism.¹⁷

This is not an attempt to dispute Gellner’s stance on this issue, rather to rectify the absence in his and the modernisation theory overall of precisely how the emotive element does fit in and to what extent. We know what it is not, but the acknowledgement of a null hypothesis does not complete the experiment. Rather than reducing nationalism to the emotional manifestation of social concerns, nationalism is a consequence of overall social conditions and the responses (emotional and otherwise) to them. It is a case of consequence and perception. As the modernists advocate nationalism does not represent only the emotional, for it does belong somewhere in the discourse. It appears that modernists remove themselves from acknowledging too much importance on the issue of emotive authority for that lends legitimacy to the ethnicist thesis. In their attempt to resolve this and move towards explaining the different flavours of nationalism, the modernists endorse the importance of culture, which may be the key to explaining the emotive.

The modernists fail to pursue this angle of nationalism, regarding this purely subjective element as mere "noise".¹⁸ If the irrational is occasionally chosen with nationalism, then why? The irrational is aligned with the emotional and psychological segments of nationalist theory. Discussions on emotive authority for example are contained in ethno-nationalist discourse, but notably absent from most modernist theory. I say most for Nairn, a modernist with ethnicist leanings, does enter into discussions about the emotive element of nationalism. This is an important factor in describing the motivations behind nationalism.¹⁹ Nairn implies that this emotive feature may come from the peasants, suggesting that the violent element of ethnic nationalism stems from here, however he fails to say why and how. This is more applicable to the emotive nationalisms we have witnessed this century.

In areas where urbanisation has occurred later in Europe the nationalism expressed has tended to be more passionate and emotive. Ireland, particularly from the Easter Rising of 1916 to the signing of the Republic, is a good example. The new nation-states of the former Yugoslavia are another. But peripheral regions like Ireland and the former Yugoslavia that undertook nationalism in this fashion may also have been doing so as a reactive measure to other more dominant nationalisms. In the Irish case it would be British nationalism, with the new nation-states of the former Yugoslavia it would be the Yugoslav regime (and perhaps Serb nationalism towards the latter period).

The emotional appeal combined with cultural depth is what makes the possession of a national identity and the practice of nationalism so appealing. The exercise of national identity is a psychological need made political. The psychological element of this equation is the need for an identity; the political component is the search for one’s own nation. Thus nationalism is the "psychological manifestation" of modernity.²⁰ Nationalism is to a group united around a nation (or the idea of a nation) what Freud’s id is to the sense of self. "Just as the id cannot be eliminated, national sovereignty is an irrational component of the collective make-up of groups that cannot be eliminated." ²¹

Rural and Urban Groups
The issues of emotionalism and ethnicity are eliminated from modernist discourse, as they do not fit into what is most valued of modernity. They represent the non-rational and so the modernists resign them to the primordialists that then aid in sustaining the fallacious dichotomies that are endured in writings on nationalism. By persisting in keeping it absent and underdeveloped the modernists construct their own theory to only particular types of nationalism. The nationalism of the modernists is one where institutions dominate and indeed are taken for granted whose followers belong to a civil society and to promote another false dichotomy, their’s is most often an urban nationalism. It follows then that there is a correlation between ethno-nationalist conflict (and thus ethno-nationalism) and rurality. The rural mass look to the past as much as to the future, though as they move to the urban areas (without the development of a civil society) there are reinventions of what is lost, especially as the link to the land is no longer direct.

The urban mass has a "parallel if different motivation" for they "are ‘seeking’ to mobilise lost-world psychology in order to build a new world".²² Civil society is the institutional Geist and ethno-nationalist behaviour is the spirit of the peasant. Any behaviour that is violent, emotive or seemingly "tribal" is now a case of the rural haunting the urban. "Ethnic nationalism is in essence a peasantry transmuted, at least in ideal terms, into a nation."²³ These cases occur in cities where peasants who have moved there or their conflicts have spilled over have penetrated them. The origin is provincial, which suggests that the transition from rural to urban may actually aggravate the conflict further, as with the ‘troubles’ in Ireland.²⁴ This is the modernist explanation for the element of emotionalism which their theory has difficulty in explaining. The Belfasts and the Sarajevos fit well into this.

To the modernists, the rural represents the past and the urban the future, and modernisation represents the struggle between the two.²⁵ One can only be a victor with the death of the other, and if this is so nationalism is not a side-effect of this struggle but its essence. So nationalism is promoted from being "a series of adjustments" to an all out struggle between two eras.²⁶ This is suggestive of the notion that nationalism is a case of the good versus the bad and enforces the fallacious civic-ethnic dichotomy. But it is not. Nationalism is neither of these and both. As discussed, it is a manifestation of modernity, and the different elements of and within modernity mean that each society concentrates on different components, and the differences in theories are just differences in emphasis.

This is an important revelation when exploring the ideas that the ethnicists emphasise and the philosophy of the modernists. What it should be is not a difference of emphasis, but a recognition that societies that are at different levels of history and development will respond to circumstances in different ways. Particularly with respect to what tools they have to respond with (i.e. what are their primary methods of communication) and how many dimensions, or rather what is the ultimate dimension, these societies operate in. From here emerge the dichotomies of East and West, Rural and Urban, Concrete versus Abstract. However, these items should not be treated as dichotomies but as descriptive categories for variations of emphases. Modernisation theory concentrates on the onset of the urban – that is material industry. But what it fails to examine is the other still predominant raw material of this society that is "the peasant masses who underwent the change". ²⁷

The Marriage of Two Sides – the Intermeshing
It has been argued throughout that civic and ethnic nationalisms are not two different ideologies, rather they are analytically different conceptions of the one ideology and movement (or "ideological movement")²⁸ of nationalism. They do however provide different subjective or "ideological bonds" for their members,²⁹ that provides the glue by which a community of people regard themselves as belonging and sharing a feeling of kinship, solidarity and unity. Citizenship is the key to the bonds within civic nationalisms, and ethnicity within ethnic nationalisms; the cement of civic nationalisms are legal codes and institutions, but within ethnic nationalisms it is customs, myths and symbols. This correlates respectively with the theories proposed by the modernists and ethnicists.

The perspective and approach of each camp is different and varied, and though theoretically they represent two separate ideals of nationalism, neither is complete on its own. In their pure forms both ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are mutually exclusive concepts stemming from the disagreement between the two as to what constitutes the essence or primary focal point of nationalism. As mutually exclusive concepts both are destined to terminally fail to satisfy a successfully functioning nationalism that achieves what it espouses towards. In practice, as intermingling concepts, they are not opposing and are not at polar ends of a spectrum. Rather they are intermeshing concepts that borrow from one another in order to see each individual movement of nationalism achieve its goal.

Whether observing the rural and religious nationalism in Ireland, the ethnic and blood nationalism in the Balkans and the Basques in Spain, civic nationalism in Britain, or territorial/ethnic nationalism in Germany they all belong to the one ideological movement. The classifications merely serve to restrict each nationalism to being backward or progressive, positive or negative, without the opportunity of being both and developing toward their ultimate goal of a nation-state.

As discussed in Chapter Two, modernists see a definite break (particularly cultural) between the agrarian age and the industrial, utilitarian era. The nation to them is only ‘natural’ insofar as it is a necessary product of capitalism. The nation is contingent upon the development and growth of capitalism, utilitarianism, and industrialisation, economics and the market, all of which demonstrate the essence of modernity itself. The problem with the modernisation theory is what lies at its core. It regards as central a free or capitalist or industrial market. Nairn, in criticism of Gellner, does come close to shifting the nucleus of the modernist theory as his own theory criss-crosses from the radical-modernists to the ethnicist-modernists. He claims that Gellner has only chosen the market as a point of reference due to the unreliability of other elements: "Having declared nationalism as perilous and democracy as insufficient, he [Gellner] tends to end up with the market as sole guarantor."³⁰ The more abstract social interaction then the more civic the nationalism, and the less likely it is to be violent, backward-looking and emotive. The nation carries with it both the rational and non-rational elements that motivate all the various features of modernity, both the idealised rational elements, and the often ill explained non-rational.

In some ways ethnicism is a rejection in extreme cases, or a dispute in milder ones, of the modernisation theory. It promotes the theory that the communal ties that existed in the pre-modern era are embedded in history and pivotal to the formation of the nation. This process is considered to be a ‘natural’ phenomenon. Blood ties, soil and tradition are seen to be closely linked to the fabric of the modern-day nation, how closely they are linked to its formation is debatable. The link between an ethnic identity of the pre-modern era transforming into a national identity in modernity via the vehicle of ethnicity, where ethnicity represents kinship which provides for the normal passage of cultural transmission.³¹ This link is not a direct one and the vehicle of ethnicity works under the guise of culture. But it does place the primacy of components like blood, race and language in the evolution towards a nation at a higher stead.

By being representations of separate theoretical forms of nationalism both the modernist and the ethnicist arrangements fail to provide a comprehensive theory of nationalism. But, if in practice each nationalism is an intermeshing of the different theoretical forms of nationalism, then providing an ample approach to nationalism an agreement on common and key features between the modernists and ethnicists should be made. A good starting point would be culture as both regard culture as an important foundation for the establishment of nationalism.

According to modernisation theory there is a definite cultural break with the pre-modern age, with the emergence of a literate "high culture" and the plausibility of a political unit – these are the fundamental elements of this theory of nationalism. The ethnicists, particularly Smith, accuse modernisation theory of being too confining to be able to encapsulate the varieties of nationalism that exist.³² However, modernisation theory is confining only to the extent of what is excluded, namely the absence of the ethnic rationale in the theory. The absence means that the theory only tells part of the story. Modernists argue that the absence of he ethnic rationale is justified for it is a "redundant" element of nationalism and inessential to the theory.³³ As Gellner states:

My main case for modernism…is that on the whole the ethnic, the cultural national community, which is an important part of Anthony’s [Smith’s] case, is rather like the navel. Some nations have it and some don’t and in any case it’s inessential. (My emphasis) ³⁴

But ethnicity is not just a disposable element of nationalism. As a variant of culture (even with the cultural shift that modernity brought on) it represents a link to the past and more importantly, provides for the motivational element of nationalism which is essential if it is to be exercised successfully and survive. Ethnicity, as a variant of culture that has been politicised with the onset of modernity, is the fuel of nationalism.

Tom Nairn’s theory locates nationalism as a product (or a cost) of the uneven development of history.³⁵ Nationalism to Nairn is a "developmental history",³⁶ an historical process into which groups of people (communities) are forced. In Nairn’s words:

The ‘-ism’ they are then compelled to follow is in reality imposed upon them from without although of course to make this adaptation, it is necessary that the usual kinds of national cadres, myths, sentiments, etc., well up from within.³⁷

Though elements in Nairn’s thesis appear sympathetic to the theories of Smith and ‘soft primordialism’ he keeps his distance by ensuring that the "causation of the drama is not within the bosom of the Volk",³⁸ but declines in recognising that the perpetuation of the "drama" is.

It is perhaps a case of the uneven development of capitalism, rather than history, as encountered by those who have experienced different histories. The different histories experienced by the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ expose them to different experiences and different reactions to development, which also espoused the differences between the nationalism of the ‘West’ and the nationalism of the ‘East’. The societies upon which capitalism was implanting itself, and the period and duration by which this was being done, were markedly different in structure, culture and experience to one another. In the ‘East’ the elites in the periphery were faced with the advancement experienced in the ‘West’, from this confrontation a new intelligentsia emerged whose role it was to mobilise the mass so not to be left behind.

The differences in history have also divided nationalism within this geography. In the ‘West’ there had already been established in society the importance of advanced communication, legal codes, civil rights and other factors which served to unite those anonymous strangers who shared these values into one group. But for the ‘East’ these developments were still un(der)developed, so when the need came to unite the masses on the path towards industrialisation the elites needed to resort to that which they already possessed and shared. These unifying factors were the myths, symbols, language, tradition and sometimes religion that were shared by the people. The tools of this mobilisation were the unique characteristics and particularities of their community, their ethnos. Thus the uneven development of industrialism and capitalism necessitated the elite of the peripheral areas to mobilise the Volk by nationalising them in order to deliver them to progress. This is where this type of nationalism began, the moment at which these same elite realised that they were at a disadvantage and needed to progress in order to be made equals in the new civilisation heralded by modernity.³⁹ In this way the concept of ‘Western’ nationalism and ‘Eastern’ nationalism is made synonymous with civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism respectively. This division is perpetuated with the labelling of regions such as the Slavic lands as backward and needing to emulate the Western nation-states in order to find a way to progress.

Conclusion
Those in the ‘East’ had to resort to the ethnos in order to unify the people in absence of other tools, and hence the link with ethnic nationalism. The civic qualities used in the ‘West,’ such as the development of the state and the modern concept of citizenship, has linked it to civic nationalism, France and Britain being examples of such. But the tools that played an important role in the initial establishment of a nation-state are not the only tools available in the practice of nationalism, especially in the twentieth century where both "types" of nationalism have progressed. It is truer to say that the nationalisms of this century are still subject to the forces of the civic and the ethnic rationale but they are not confined to it. Rather, modern nationalism is an interplay of these components.

Consequently, due to the variety of divisions of nationalism, and the variety of definitions within these divisions, Smith regards nationalism as an approach and perspective, but not a theory.⁴⁰ However the possibility of a theory of nationalism should not be easily dismissed nor limited to the process of being just an approach or a perspective as it goes beyond this. Nationalism is also a motivator, demonstrated most explicitly by Greenfeld, though she carried this idea a bit too far. Her claims are that it was nationalism that motivated modernity and not nationalism as a product (or cost as Nairn would have it) of capitalism. Smith also recognised nationalism as a motivator. The "ethno-symbolic" as Smith labels it, helps to explain nationalism’s popular appeal. In fact, it is perhaps the ethnic element of nationalism that gives it its greatest motivational power, and this is what Gellner failed to recognise by leaving out the ethnic element in his theory. Nationalism as an approach is a part of the process of nationalism and thus a part of the theory. It is Smith’s analysis in this manner that is "Euclidean" by limiting nationalism to being just an approach and a perspective. The approach is pivotal in describing the nature and content of the nationalism to be practised by a group of people. That is, the path taken (whether it be that which is elected or that which is ‘natural’) will impel a group of people towards a particular type of nationalism, unique to themselves but capable of being broadly defined as a hybrid of both ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism.

No exercise of nationalism is the same, but they are all an exercise of the one phenomenon. Nationalism is an interplay of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism and all their characteristics. The civic and the ethnic demonstrate two broad categories of concentration, but neither is exclusive. They are analytically different, but each nation, or group of people that consider themselves a nation and practise nationalism, carry elements of both. Just as the ethnicist and modernist theories are not complete on their own, so too their correlated ideals of the ethnic and the civic are not complete either. Neither is sufficient on its own to forge a nation. A civic nationalism must crystallise the ethnic components of its members in order to provide vigour and appeal to the nationalism, and thus be able to succeed onwards towards the establishment and perpetuation of nationhood. Likewise, ethnic nationalism must institutionalise to realise its goals. Ethnicity transmitted by culture carries with it the tools and in some cases the foundations of new nations they do not work on their own however and are not the root of the nationalism. Nationalism is a modern phenomenon that should not exclude the persistence of ethnicity as a popular motivation that fuels it.

In order for either nationalism to be fulfilled they must each adopt characteristics from one another. Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism only provide the nature of the route towards their goal. To accomplish this journey various elements must be undertaken from the menu of options from both civic and ethnic nationalism. It is a matter of adding some of the ingredients of ethnic nationalism to the character of civic nationalism, or vice versa. The importance of the starting point of this route is one that determines the initial concept of the nation, that is, what elements are most emphasised as important to the fabric of the design of the nation. Thus a successful practice of nationalism is one where the process is an interaction of both civic and ethnic nationalism, an intermeshing of the two.